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LEADING ARTICLE 
VARIATIONS ON THE THEME OF DOMBROWSKI v. 
PFISTER: FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN STATE 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AFFECTING 
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
MARC STICKGOLD* 
One of the most rapidly changing and complex areas of the 
law revolves around the propriety and wisdom of federal 
court ((interference" with state court proceedings involv-
ing first amendment rights. Mr. Stickgold examines the 
doctrine being evolved in this area, centering the discus-
sion around Dombrowski v. Pfister and cases that have fol-
lowed it. The author reports that several courts have not 
followed the Dombrowski mandates, and consequently, 
fundamental first amendment freedoms are not adequately 
protected. 
The purpose of this article is to examine the implementation and 
development of a Supreme Court mandate to the United States 
district courts. The time span between the pronouncement of a 
mandate and its understanding and correct implementation by the 
lower courts is often great. In Dombrowski v. Pfister,1 the Su-
preme Court ordered that lower federal courts immediately con-
sider two attacks on state criminal prosecutions affecting speech ac-
tivities: those where it is alleged that the prosecution is under a 
statute vague and overbroad on its face, and those where it is al-
leged that protected speech activities are the basis of a prosecution 
in bad faith, for the purpose of discouraging and intimidating per-
sons in the exercise of first amendment rights.2 The Court further 
,. Assistant Dean, University of Wisconsin Law School. B.A., 1960, 
University of Illinois; J.D., 1963, Northwestern University. 
1 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
2 Id. at 489-92. Although I am confident that Dombrowski issued' the 
mandate indicated, there is still some lingering doubt as to whether both 
attacks are necessary to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983(1964), or whether the mandate governs when either attack is 
present. Dombrowski clearly considered the two attacks separately. Jus-
tices Black, Stewart, and Harlan, however, dissenting in Cameron v. John-
son, 381 U.S. 741 (1965), indicate that both evils must be present. See text 
accompanying notes 113-57 infra. Commentators on the subject have al-
most uniformly accepted the "two prong" theory of Dombrowski. See 
Bailey, Enjoining State Criminal Prosecutions which Abridge First Amend-
ment Freedoms, 3 HARv. CIV. Lm.-CIV. RIGHTS L. REV. 67, 85-86 n.59 (1967); 
Boyer, Federal Injunctive Relief: A Counterpoise Against the Use of State 
Criminal Prosecutions Designed to Deter the Exercise of Preferred Consti-
tutional Rights, 13 How. L.J. 51, 84 (1967); Brewer, Dombrowski v. Pfister: 
Federal Injunctions Against State Prosecutions In Civil Rights Cases-A 
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ordered that either declaratory or injunctive relief, or both, be 
granted if either of these evils is established.3 In Cameron v. 
Johnson4 and Zwickler v. Koota,5 the Court has further refined the 
intricacies of some of the issues raised in Dombrowski by again 
ordering lower federal courts not to abstain from deciding whether 
declaratory or injunctive relief is appropriate when substantial 
first amendment issues are raised.6 
This article will explore the contours of the issues and pro-
nouncements in Dombrowski;7 examine how the mandate has been 
implemented and developed in cases subsequent to Dombrowski; 
and discuss the presumptions and perspectives which should guide 
courts in this area. 
I. THE THEME: DOMBROWSKI V. PFISTER 
Early in October 1963, James Dombrowski, Director of the South-
ern Conference Educational Fund (SCEF), along with Benjamin 
Smith, its treasurer, and Bruce Waltzer, its attorney, were arrested 
by state and local police on warrants charging violation of the 
Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law and 
the Communist Propaganda Control Law.s Search warrants were 
issued, and the homes and offices of these men were searched.o 
SCEF had been engaged in civil rights activity in various Southern 
states since the late thirties. Its purpose was "to help secure to 
Negro citizens the rights guaranteed to them under the United 
States Constitution and to end all forms of racial segregation and 
discrimination in the interest of Negro and white citizens of the 
Southern States."10 
New Trend in Federal-State JUdicial Relations, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 80 
(1965); The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 150, 173 (1965); 
Note, The Dombrowski Remedy-Federal Injunctions Against State Court 
Proceedings Violative of Constitutional Rights, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 92, 96 
(1966); 1966 DUKE L.J. 219; 21 RUTGERS L. HEV. 679, 681, 691 (1967); 3 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 76, 83 (1966); 32 TENN. L. REV. 641, 642 (1965). See also 
Comment, Theories of Federalism and Civil Rights, 75 YALE L.J. 1007, 1033 
(1966), and 27 U. PITT. L. REV. 145 (1965), which recognize, but criticize, 
the "two prong" theory. 
3 380 U.S. at 492, 497-98. 
4 381 U.S. 741 (1965). 
5 389 U.S. 241 (1967). 
6 Federal courts have exercised the power to enJOIn state criminal 
prosecutions affecting speech activities for other reasons. See McSure1y v. 
Ratliff, Civil No. 1146 (E.D. Ky., Sept. 14, 1967); Hulett v. Julian, 250 F. 
Supp. 208 (M.D. Ala. 1966). 
7 This article will not deal with federal intervention in state criminal 
proceedings dealing with nonspeech activities. 
S Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law, LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 14:358-:374 (Supp. 1968); Communist Propaganda Control Law, 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14: 390-: 390.8 (Supp. 1962). 
9 See Judge Wisdom's dissent for a description of the search. Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 573 (E.D. La. 1964). 
10 See Complaint, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 
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The arrest warrants were quashed by a Louisiana parish judge 
because there was no probable cause for their issuance. The 
seized evidence was suppressed on the ground that the raids were 
illegal. "Louisiana officials continued, however, to threaten prose-
cution .... "ll Shortly thereafter, a Louisiana grand jury was 
convened to consider evidence against SCEF and its officials. On 
November 12,1963, Dombrowski and SCEF filed a suit in the United 
States district court for declaratory and injunctive relief. 
The federal suit alleged that the actions taken by state and 
local officials were for the illegal purpose of deterring SCEF's civil 
rights activities and destroying its capacity to function. It further 
alleged that the statutory sections under which the criminal prose-
cutions had been brought were unconstitutional on their face and 
as applied. It supported the suit with offers of proof and affidavits 
dealing with the legitimacy of the conduct of SCEF and the other 
plaintiffs, the nature of the official action directed against them 
by James Pfister and others, and the announced purpose of such 
official action.12 
Judge Wisdom issued a temporary restraining order against fur-
ther prosecution pending the decision of the three judge court 
which had been convened to consider the constitutional attack on 
the statutes. The three judge court dismissed the suit for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and dissolved 
the temporary restraining order.ls Judge Wisdom dissented.14 
The district court held that the substantial nature of the consti-
tutional issues raised did not, in itself, justify interference in the 
state proceeding, particularly where the state's right of self-pres-
ervation, "the last vestige of the dignity of sovereignty," was at 
issue.15 It indicated that although interference with state proceed-
ings has been allowed "under exceptional circumstances," no such 
1964). It is interesting to note that both Smith and Waltzer were arrested 
while attending the first interracial lawyers conference held in New Or-
leans in the 20th century. See Brewer, supra note 2, at 75. . 
11 380 U.S. at 488. The seized books and records found their way into 
the hands of Chairman Pfister of the Louisiana Joint Legislative Commis-
sion on Un-American Activities, and on November 8, 1963, SCEF was 
named in a committee resolution as a "Communist front organization." 
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, App. A, para. 14 (E.D. La. 1964). 
12 See Complaint, Intervening Complaint, Offers of Proof, and Affadavits, 
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964). Portions of the 
complaint are reproduced in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 564 
(E.D. La. 1964). 
13 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964). The three 
judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1964). 
14 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 569 (E.D. La. 1964). Judge 
Wisdom feels abstention was totally inappropriate; would find certain sec-
tions of the law unconstitutional on their face; would require a hearing on 
the allegations of "bad faith" application of the laws; and would issue 
injunctive relief if the allegations are proven. 
15 Id. at 559. 
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circumstances existed here. It looked to the importance of the 
state's interest, and found that "[n] one of the cases [where inter-
ference was sanctioned] involved so fundamental an element of 
state sovereignty as that of self-preservation."16 
The court determined that federal legislation and case law did 
not supercede the right of a state to prosecute for sedition against 
the state itself, and that since the state could constitutionally pro-
ceed, the resolution of plaintiffs' constitutional challenges should 
be in the state criminal proceedings. Likewise, the court refused 
an evidentiary hearing on the unconstitutional application of the 
statutes (although recognizing that such "evidence has been fre-
quently admitted") since "here the very vitals of our constitu-
tional system of government are on the line."17 According to the 
court, the preservation of the integrity of the state criminal process, 
the avoidance of undue conflict between the sovereigns, and a pos-
sible saving interpretation of the statutes by the state courts all 
dictated abstention.1s 
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction19 in order to 
resolve a "seeming conflict" between the district court decision in 
Dombrowski and the later Supreme Court decision in Baggett v. 
Bullitt,20 "and to settle important questions concerning federal in-
16 Id. at 560 n.1. The district court cites and attempts to distinguish 
eight cases in which interference was allowed. 
17 Id. at 564. See Gibson v. Florida, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Louisiana ex. reI. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 
U.S. 293 (1961); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP 
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
18 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 559-64 (E.D. La. 1964). 
19 377 U.S. 976 (1964). 
20 377 U.S. 360 (1964). Baggett was decided by the Supreme Court on 
June 1, 1964, whereas the Louisiana district court decided Dombrowski on 
February 20, 1964. The history of Baggett can be followed in Nostrand v. 
Balmer, 53 Wash. 2d 460, 335 P.2d 10 (1959), vacated and remanded sub 
nom., Nostrand v. Little, 362 U.S. 474 (1960); Nostrand v. Little, 58 Wash. 
2d 111, 361 P.2d 551 (1961), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 436 (1962); Baggett 
v. Bullitt, 215 F. Supp. 439 (W.D. Wash. 1963). 
In Baggett, 64 members of the faculty, staff, and student body of the 
University of Washington brought a class action to have certain 1931 and 
1955 Washington statutes that required the execution of two different 
loyalty oaths as a condition of employment declared unconstitutional, and 
for an injunction against the enforcement of these statutes against some of 
the plaintiffs. The three judge court held the 1955 oath constitutional. It 
also held that, although there were sUbstantial constitutional questions as 
to the validity of the 1931 oath, it would abstain in favor of state court 
adjudication. The Supreme Court held abstention inappropriate, and then 
examined the two oaths and found them both vague and overbroad. 
The state labels as wholly fanciful the suggested possible coverage 
of the two oaths. It may well be correct, but the contention only 
emphasizes the difficulties with the two statutes; for if the oaths do 
not reach some or any of the behavior suggested, what specific con-
duct do the oaths cover? Where does fanciful possibility end and 
intended coverage begin? 
It will not do to say that a prosecutor's sense of fairness and the 
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junctions against state criminal prosecutions threatening constitu-
tionally protected expression."21 The Court may have unsettled 
more questions than it settled, but it addressed itself to the follow-
ing significant points. First, what kinds of challenges to state 
criminal prosecutions threatening constitutionally protected ex-
pression will establish irreparable harm sufficient to state a fed-
eral equitable claim? Second, when is it appropriate to avoid 
decision on these challenges and abstain in favor of state court 
adjudication of the issues? 
II. THE SETTLED ISSUES-THE UNSETTLED ISSUES 
A. Irreparable Harm 
The Court began by restating the rule that "it is generally to be 
assumed that state courts and prosecutors will observe constitu-
tional limitations as expounded by this Court, and that the mere 
possibility of erroneous initial application of constitutional stand-
ards will usually not amount to the irreparable injury necessary 
to justify a disruption of orderly state proceedings."22 The injury 
"normally incident" to a criminal proceeding "brought lawfully 
and in good faith"23 is insufficient to "warrant cutting short the 
normal adjudication of constitutional issues in the course of a 
criminal prosecution."24 
The first question in Dombrowski, therefore, narrowed to whether 
the two evils alleged25 involved merely the "erroneous initial appli-
cation of constitutional standards" incident to an "otherwise good 
faith criminal prosecution" or "irreparableinjury."26 The Su-
preme Court found that these allegations by plaintiffs 
Constitution would prevent a successful perjury prosecution for some 
of the activities seemingly embraced within the sweeping statutory 
definitions. The hazard of being prosecuted for knowing but guilt-
less behavior remains. . .. Well-intentioned prosecutors and judi-
cial safeguards do not neutralize the vice of a vague law. Baggett v. 
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373 (1964). . 
21 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). 
22 Id. at 484-85 (emphasis added). See Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 
U.S. 157 (1943). 
23 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
24 Id. See Beal v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 312 U.S. 45 (1941) (mere 
threat of a single prosecution); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 
U.S. 89 (1935) (same); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941) (no irreparable 
injury or constitutional infirmity in statute); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 
240 (1926) (same). 
25 Originally, James A. Dombrowski, Executive Director of the Southern 
Conference Educational Fund, Inc., and the SCEF were the plaintiffs. Sub-
sequently, a motion to intervene as plaintiffs was granted on behalf of 
Benjamin E. Smith, Treasurer of SCEF, and Bruce C. Waltzer, "a friend 
and supporter" of SCEF and an attorney active in civil rights. All four 
parties are referred to as plaintiffs. Plaintiffs actually alleged more than 
two evils, but the other allegations were either dropped on appeal or as-
similated into the two main points. 
26 380 U.S. at 484-85. 
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depict a situation in which the defense of the State's crimi-
nal prosecution will not assure adequate vindication of 
constitutional rights. They suggest that a substantial loss 
or impairment of freedom of expression will occur if ap-
pellants must await the state court's disposition and ulti-
mate review in this Court of any adverse determination. 
These allegations, if true, clearly show irreparable in-
jury.27 
We shall examine the reasons why the harm caused by these 
two evils is severe enough to justify early intervention in state 
processes.28 
1. MISUSE OF A STATUTE 
The complaint in Dombrowski alleged that the threat to enforce 
the statute against the plaintiffs was made not with an "expecta-
tion of securing valid convictions," but rather as part of a plan to 
"harass appellants and discourage them and their supporters from 
asserting and attempting to vindicate the constitutional rights of 
Negro citizens of Louisiana."2o Since the district court denied an 
evidentiary hearing on these allegations,30 the issue before the Su-
preme Court was not whether a "bad faith prosecution" had, in 
fact, been established, but whether sufficient allegations of bad 
faith were stated under section 1983 (the Civil Rights Act) 31 to 
require the district court to adjudicate the issues and fashion ap-
propriate relief should plaintiffs prevail,32 The lower court's dis-
missal was reversed. The Supreme Court said: 
[AJ ppellants have attacked the good faith of the appellees 
in enforcing the statutes, claiming that they have invoked, 
and threaten to continue to invoke, criminal process with-
out any hope of ultimate success, but only to discourage 
appellants' civil rights activities. . .. [TJhese allegations 
state a claim under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.33 
The phrase "without any hope of ultimate success" is important 
in understanding the Court's reasoning. It is not infrequent that a 
prosecutor can count on the local judge or jury to convict politi-
cal dissenters or others holding unpopular views, regardless of the 
.27 Id. at 485-86. 
28 See the caveat in note 2 supra. 
29 380 U.S. at 482. The complaint was supported by affadavits and of-
fers of proof. See note 10 supra. 
30 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 563 (E.D. La. 1964). 
31 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). 
32 The Supreme Court remanded the case for a hearing by the district 
court on the "bad faith" attack. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 497-
98 (1965). The hearing has not been held, and a temporary restraining 
order issued pending the hearing is still in effect. See 21 RUTGERS L. REV., 
supra note 2, at 95 n.22. 
33 380 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added). 
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facts or law in the case.34 However, the concept of "ultimate 
success" includes appeals through the state system and the pos-
sibility of certiorari or appeal to the Supreme Court of the United 
States. It is the "hope of success" at these higher, unbiased levels of 
review that must be examined. 
The elements necessary to establish a bad faith prosecution have 
yet to be articulated.35 Involving as it does an inquiry into the 
state of mind and the intentions of prosecutors and other state 
officials, the burden of establishing deliberate intent to suppress 
speech activities is almost insurmountable.36 In most cases, there 
are bound to be ambiguities as to the state's purpose in initiating 
arrests or prosecutions.37 The area between those cases where 
valid statutes are clearly intentionally misapplied to protected 
speech activities, and those where the statute is found to be uncon-
stitutional "as applied," but without proof of intentional miscon-
duct by state officials is wide, and will probably encompass most 
cases. 
The phrase "bad faith prosecution"38 in the opinion seems to ex-
clude cases where the prosecution is obviously unconstitutional, but 
where no direct proof of the prosecutor's intent is available. For 
example, it has been suggested that discriminatory enforcement of 
34 Lusky, Racial Discrimination and the Federal Law: A Problem in 
Nullification, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (1963). After discussing numerous 
examples of such local bias, Professor Lusky comments: 
It is sometimes forgotten that the principal, if not the only, reason 
for establishment of the lower federal courts was the need for deal-
ing with local opposition to, or disregard of, the federal law. Unless 
they perform this function adequately, there is little reason to have 
them at all. rd. at 1178. 
35 For Dombrowski's statement, see text accompanying note 33 supra. 
Also see text accompanying notes 36-42 infra. Just how much of a "hint" 
of improper purpose must be established is still unsettled. The burden 
imposed is presently an extremely onerous one, see note 36 infra,. and it 
has been suggested that the burden be revised. See Bailey, supra note 2, 
at 102-2l. 
36 Two cases where the burden has been overcome are NAACP v. 
Thompson, 357 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1966); and Cox v. Louisiana, 348 F.2d 750 
(5th Cir. 1965) (reversing denial of removal), 363 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1966) 
(vacated for further consideration in light of City of Greenwood v. Pea-
cock, 384 U.S. 808 [1966], and Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 [1966]). 
The burden has often proved too great. See Brooks v. Briley, 274 F. Supp. 
538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967); Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 
1966); Cameron v. Johnson, 262 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Miss. 1966); Turner v. 
LaBelle, 251 F. Supp. 443 (D. Conn. 1966). See also Bailey, supra note 2, 
at 96. 
37 To determine the purpose, courts have looked to public announcements 
by government officials in newspapers or other news media, statements of 
legislators, and the history of the practice attacked and its effect on pro-
tected activities. 
38 The term is used in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490 (1965), 
and is apparently meant to distinguish the type of situation present in 
Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), where the state was held 
to be proceeding in "good faith." 
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a valid statute should be sufficient to abort a prosecution in its 
inception.s9 And prosecutions under a law phrased in general 
terms but passed with the clear intent that it be applied to specific 
activities which the court finds to be protected should also support 
relief.40 Conversely, use of a law which has lain dormant and un-
used for a considerable period might give rise to a presumption 
that the prosecution is primarily to suppress the speech activity, 
not vindicate some ongoing socially justifiable state policy.41 Each 
of these types of state enforcement should legitimately be placed 
under the "bad faith" heading. They represent instances where the 
attack on the speech activities so overwhelms any possible state 
interest in a continuing policy of legitimate concern that a strong 
presumption should arise that the "purpose" of the prosecution is 
to thwart first amendment rights.42 
39 See Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), which refers to 
the propriety of injunctive relief in a case like Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 
(1939), where state officials acted in "bad faith" to drive union organizers 
out of the area. 
40 See Cameron v. Johnson, 244 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Miss. 1964), rev'd and 
remanded per curiam, 262 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Miss. 1966), prob. juris. noted, 
389 U.S. 809 (1967); Bush v. School Bd., 194 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. La. 1961). 
Compare United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 
386 U.S. 911, with O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967). 
41 In Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), the Court held that no justi-
ciable issue was presented where a doctor and his patient sued for a dec-
laration that Connecticut's laws against both giving advice on contra-
ceptives and their use were unconstitutional. The primary basis for the 
holding was that no "imminent prosecution" was established. The Court 
said: 
But even 'were we to read the allegations to convey a clear threat of 
imminent prosecutions, we are not bound to accept as true all that 
is alleged. . .. The Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contra-
ceptives has been on the State's books since 1879 ... , During the 
more than three quarters of a century since its enactment, a pros-
ecution for its violation seems never to have been initiated, except 
in one case. See State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856 (1940). 
See aLso Turner v. La Belle, 251 F. Supp. 443 (D. Conn. 1966). 
42 See Bailey, supra note 2, at 104-06, where the author suggests that a 
"preliminary" hearing be held in federal court when a colorable first 
amendment claim has been made, to determine whether "state officials, 
however sincere, have ... put together sufficient evidence to support con-
stitutionally permissible prosecution." This would include an "inquiry ... 
whether the law sought to be enforced could, in light of the first amend-
ment, reasonably and constitutionally be applied to the conduct in which 
the petitioners engaged." 
Another possible aspect of "bad faith" has been raised with regard 
to the searches and seizures in Dombrowski. It was alleged in Dombrowski 
v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967), that state officials had a working relation-
ship with the United States Internal Security Subcommittee, through its 
Chairman, Senator Eastland, and its Chief Counsel. A suit was filed, pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), alleging an illegal conspiracy to seize 
the records, and, requesting damages against Senator Eastland and his 
Chief Counsel. The Supreme Court held that although Senator Eastland 
was immune from such a suit, his Chief Counsel was not, and recovery of 
damages was warranted if the alleged conspiracy with Louisiana officials 
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2. VAGUENESS ATTACK ON STATUTE REGULATING EXPRESSION 
Dombrowski also alleged that the statutes under which he was 
being prosecuted43 were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.44 
The district court opinion conceded that these allegations raised 
serious first amendment issues,45 but held that "the normal ad-
judication of constitutional defenses in the course of state criminal 
prosecutions"46 was sufficient. The Supreme Court reversed, find-
ing the district court's conventional view of irreparable harm too 
limited. 
A criminal prosecution under a statute regulating expres-
sion usually involves imponderables and contingencies that 
themselves may inhibit the full exercise of First Amend-
ment freedoms .... When the statutes also have an over-
broad sweep, as is here alleged, the hazard of loss or sub-
stantial impairment of those precious rights may be criti-
cal. For in such cases, the statutes lend themselves too 
readily to denial of those rights.47 
The Court based its decision, therefore, both on the harm implicit 
in the threat posed by the vagueness and overbreadth of the stat-
ute itself, and the legitimacy of the existence of a prosecution under 
that statute. The Supreme Court reiterated that the assump-
tion that defense of a criminal prosecution will generally assure 
ample vindication of constitutional rights is unfounded when the 
statute regulates expression and is attacked as vague and over-
broad.48 "For the threat of sanctions may deter ... almost as 
potently as the actual application of sanctionS."40 The point seems 
to be that when the existence of the state proceeding is challenged 
in federal court as unconstitutional, the plaintiffs cannot be rele-
gated to that proceeding for their hearing. And if the challenge 
succeeds, the state proceeding cannot continue. 
The Court feels there is "danger of tolerating, in the area of 
First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute sus-
ceptible of sweeping and improper application."50 The "chilling 
effect" on the exercise of free speech can result, "however expedi-
tious" the state court proceedings. The prosecution itself, "unaf-
was proven. See Pfister v. Arceneaux, 376 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1966), which 
was the suit against the Louisiana officials. 
48 See note 8 supra. 
44 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 565 (E.D. La. 1964). 
4~ Id. at 559. 
46 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). 
47 Id. at 486 (emphasis added). 
48 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 
360 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); City of Altus v. Carr, 
255 F. Supp. 828, 836 (W.D. Tex. 1966); Bush v. School Bd., 194 F. Supp. 
182 (E.D. La. 1961), aff'd sub nom., Tugwell v. Bush, 367 U.S. 907 (1961). 
40 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486, citing NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
50 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
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fected by the prospects of its success or failure,"51 may cause im-
permissible burdens on speech. "Because of the sensitive na-
ture of constitutionally protected expression, we have not required 
that all of those subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution 
to test their rights."52 
Criminal prosecution always imposes burdens on the defendant. 
These burdens act, and are intended to act, not only to initiate 
the criminal process, but to halt the activities in which the 
individual was engaged. It can therefore be seen that a different 
problem may be posed when these burdens serve to stifle pro-
tected speech activities rather than some other activity of less im-
portance in our society.53 
These burdens are limitless, but they can be grouped generally. 
First, the burdens that arise from the normal criminal process: 
arrest,54 bail,55 detention,56 and tria1.57 A related burden, present 
51 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965). See Baggett v. 
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Gre-
million v. United States, 368 U.S. 11 (1961); Bush v. School Bd., 194 F. 
Supp. 182 (E.D. La. 1961). 
52 380 U.S. at 486. 
53 These other activities mayor may not be illegal. Acquittal is nor.,. 
mally considered sufficient protection to vindicate a legitimate activity 
which was inappropriately halted by the initiation of criminal procedures. 
Speech, as a "preferred freedom," may call not only for quicker and more 
certain vindication, but for different remedies to assure these results. 
54 The use of arrests to deter civil rights workers is the most obvious 
contemporary example. The same is now true of anti-Vietnam War demon-
strations. Thousands were arrested during the "freedom rides" and "sit-ins" 
in the South, hundreds in Mississippi alone. Professor Lusky discusses the 
Mississippi experience. Lusky, supra note 34. More recently, arrest has 
been used to break up demonstrations and other activities directed against 
the role of the United States in the Vietnam War. In New York City, dur-
ing December 4-8, 1967, hundreds of demonstrators were arrested and 
briefly jailed, only to be released without charge a few hours later, when 
the demonstration had ended. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1967, § 1, at 1, col. 4; 
id., at 12, col. 1. 
55 In Bailey v. Patterson, 199 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Miss. 1961), the total 
bail required by the state courts for the freedom riders was $372,000. See 
Boyer, supra note 2, at 95. The evils of the present bail system prevalent 
in most American jurisdictions have prompted great criticism. See, e.g., 
D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES: 1964-A REPORT TO'l.'HE 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 53 (1964), where the 
authors conclude that high bail had been employed in civil rights cases 
"as punishment or to deter continued demonstrations"; Foote, Coming Con-
stitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (1965); Note, Bail mid Civil 
Rights, 2 LAW IN TRANS. Q. 111 (1965); Note, Bail.: The Need for Reconsid-
eration, 59 Nw. U.L .. REV. 678 (1964). See also The Federal Bail Reform 
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146, 3152 (1966). 
56 High bail, besides effectively draining the financial resources of the 
defendant and those who support him, often has a direct effect on subse-
quent proceedings· in the case. The threat of prolonged pre-conviction 
detention in lieu of bail often forces guilty pleas which would not otherwise 
be entered. Those who do not plead guilty may spend many weeks or 
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in every case, is the extra-legal sanctions, including stigmatiza-
tion and disruption of personal life, which arise automatically 
from the imposition of the first type.58 The third type of burden-
peculiar to speech cases--is a burden placed upon "all society"59: 
others will be deterred from speech activities. The Dombrowski 
court expressed concern on this point in indicating why the nor-
mal "standing" requirements in a case involving first amendment 
freedoms were loosened to take into consideration possible threats 
to persons not party to the law suit. "For free expression-of 
transcendent value to all society, and not merely to those exercis~ 
ing their rights-might be the loser."60 Professor Kinoy has re-
marked of Justice Brennan's opinion: "[T]he Justice was not re-
ferring solely to the 'chilling effect' on the individuals who are 
caught in the toils of repressive legislation. Not at all. He wrote of 
the 'chilling effect' on the exercise of these rights by the entire 
nation."61 Unnumbered, unknown people62 may be deterred from 
months in jail awaiting trial. Often the pre-conviction detention period 
will be longer than the maximum possible sentence for the offense with 
which the defendant is charged. Acquittal is of little use if more than 
the maximum possible sentence has already been served. 
57 See Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960), where al-
though the case did not involve speech activities, the "burdens" of being 
forced to trial for legitimate activities is illustrated. 
58 See 80 HARV. L. REV. 1490, 1496 (1967). The number, variety, and 
seriousness of extra-legal sanctions are limited only by the imagination of 
those attempting to impose the sanctions. The most obvious, and frequent, 
personal sanctions are loss of employment, or various rights connected with 
employment; loss of student status (many of the plaintiffs in Zwicker v. 
Boll, 270 F. Supp. 131 [W.D. Wis. 1967], see text accompanying notes 175-
186 infra, have been expelled from the University of Wisconsin on one 
pretext or another, although their convictions are on appeal to the Wis-
consin Supreme Court, and Zwicker v. Boll is still pending in the United 
States Supreme Court); loss of various opportunities for status or improve-
ment in status, such as promotion, pay increases, etc.; social ostracism, 
including expulsion from social clubs, or the more informal and insidious 
exclusion from social activities in which one was previously invited to 
participate; political defeat; economic ruin, as through boycotts, threats; or 
loss of good will; harassment to family, in the form of letters, phone calls, 
personal insults, or threats; and ridicule and public obloquy, including 
unfavorable newspaper and radio-TV coverage. 
Organizational activities can likewise be destroyed. Membership and 
contributions often cease when public knowledge of association with a 
particular organization is likely to produce repercussions against the indi-
viduals. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); 
Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Robison, Pro-
tection of Associations from Compulsory Disclosure of Membership, 58 
COLUM. L. REV. 614 (1958). . 
59 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
60 Id. 
61 Kinoy, Brief Remarks on Dombrowski v. Pfister-A New Path in 
Constitutional Litigation?, 26 GUILD PRACTITIONER 1, 7 (1967). 
62 Dombrowski expands the concept of "irreparable harm" necessary to 
justify equitable intervention, and reaffirms the liberalized concept of 
"standing" in first amendment cases. One of the. broadest statements on 
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exercIsmg their first amendment rights if criminal prosecution, 
"however expeditious,"63-and whether ultimate acquittal comes or 
not64-is permitted. Dombrowski declared: "We believe that those 
affected by a statute are entitled to be free of the burdens of de-
fending prosecutions, however expeditious, aimed at hammering 
out the structure of the statute piecemeal, with no likelihood of 
obviating similar uncertainty for others."G5 Those with a scrupu-
lous regard for the proscriptions and limits of the law66 might steer 
clear of the areas of protected expression to be certain not to risk 
involvement with the criminal process.G7 Fear is a powerful deter-
rent, and when aimed at first amendment activities, it gives rise to 
the "chilling effect"G8 which most bothers the Court. When a prose-
cution is threatened, therefore, and one or both of the two Dom-
browski evils are alleged, a federal claim for equitable relief has 
been stated. 
B. Abstention and Comity 
Even though a claim may be stated under the Civil Rights Act,GO 
the courts must still deal with the Siamese twins of "comity"70 
standing can be read in Heckler v. Shepard, 243 F. Supp. 841 (D. Idaho 
1965), where plaintiffs attacked a state loyalty oath. 
It does not appear from the evidence before us, even after hearing 
the case on the merits, that any of the plaintiffs have been injured 
by the operation of the challenged statute, or that any of them would 
actually be injured by its enforcement; nevertheless, in view of con-
trolling precedent, the standing of plaintiffs to have the constitu-
tional issues adjudicated is no longer open to question. Id. at 844. 
Numerous commentators on Dombrowski have noted the Court's con-
cern with the effect on third persons of state actions affecting speech ac-
tivities. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 171 
(1965); 32 TENN. L. REV. 641, 642 (1965). 
63 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965). 
64 Id. at 486. 
65 Id. at 491. 
66 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 385 (1964); Amsterdam, The Void-for-
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960). 
67 Spieser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
68 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965). See Baggett v. 
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Wolft 
v. Selective Servo Local Bd. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967); Bush v. 
School Bd., 194 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. La. 1961). 
69 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). There are, of course, a number of sections 
that the courts refer to as the "Civil Rights Act." Appellants in Dom-
browski alleged infringements of id. §§ 1971, 1981, 1983, 1985. It appears, 
however, that the Court considered the claim to be stated under id. § 1983. 
See Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1965). References to the Civil 
Rights Act in this article will be to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) unless otherwise 
noted. 
70 See Boyer, supra note 2, at 62; Taylor & Willis, The Power of Federal 
Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 YALE L.J. 1169' (1933); 
Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1930); 
Note, Federal Civil Procedure: Anti-Injunction Statute's Application to 
Civil Rights Cases, 1965 DUKE L.J. 813; Note, Federal Injunctions Against 
State Criminal Proceedings, 4 STAN. L. REV. 381 (1952). See, e.g., England 
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and "abstention."7l The doctrine of abstention is a judge fashioned 
vehicle72 whereby a federal court refuses to proceed in a case over 
which it clearly has jurisdiction. It is normally invoked to allow a 
state court decision on an issue of state law which will avoid or 
moot the federal constitutional issue raised,73 or to prevent "un-
seemly conflict" between the state and federal courts, and thereby 
preserve the concept of "comity."74 
The modern abstention doctrine originated in Railroad Commis-
sion v. PuLLman CO.75 A unanimous court, emphasizing a de-
sire to "avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction 
of a premature constitutional adjudication,"76 refused to exercise 
jurisdiction because of a possible interpretation of state law that 
would be controlling.77 Pullman reflects, therefore, the two basic 
underpinnings of abstention: a desire to avoid premature consti-
tutional decision and a "furthering [of] the harmonious relation 
between state and federal authority."78 The Court's main empha-
sis was, however, on the first point.79 
The comity issue is often phrased that the state judicial system 
provides procedures whereby the plaintiff's issues can be raised and 
resolved;80 that an "unseemly conflict" between state and federal 
v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964); Government Employees v. 
Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 45 
(1941). 
71 See, Federal Judicial Power: The Doctrine of Equitable Abstention, 
2 RACE REL. L. REP. 1222 (1957); Boyer, supra note 2, at 76; Wright, The 
Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEX. L. REV. 815 (1959); Develop-
ments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1045 (1965); Note, 
Judicial Abstention From the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 COLUM. 
L. REV. 749 (1959); Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Proceedings, 74 
HARV. L. REV. 726 (1961); Note, The Abstention Doctrine, 17 VAND. L. REV. 
124 (1964). See, e.g., Louisana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 
360 U.S. 25 (1959); Compare Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), with 
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), and Ashwander v. TVA, 297 
U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (concurring opinion). 
n England v. Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964). 
73 See note 71 supra. . 
74 See note 70 supra. 
75 312 U.S. 496 (1941). For a case decided the same year, implementing 
the abstention commands of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964), see Toucey v. New 
York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941). 
76 Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 50l. 
70 Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 45 (1941). 
80 Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 
241 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964). Com-
pare Davis v. Jury Comm'n, 261 F. Supp. 591 (M.D. Ala. 1966), and Kelley 
v. Wallace, 257 F. Supp. 343 (M.D. Ala. 1966); with Hulett v. Julian, 250 F. 
Supp. 208 (M.D. Ala. 1966); Midwest Video Corp. v. Campbell, 250 F. Supp. 
158 (D.C.N.M. 1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 215 F. Supp. 439 (W.D. Wash. 1963), 
rev'd 377 U.S. 360 (1964). Contra, McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 
(1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. 
Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966). 
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courts would result if jurisdiction was exercised;81 or that the fed-
eral court should not interfere in the absence of a showing of bad 
faith on the part of the state system.82 On the issue of enjoining 
criminal prosecutions, a broad rule of comity justified abstention 
in Douglas v. City of Jeanette.83 
Douglas was a federal suit to restrain threatened criminal prose-
cution of Jehovahs' Witnesses who were making house to house dis-
tribution of books and pamphlets. The prosecution was under a 
peddler's licensing ordinance. The suit alleged that the ordinance 
"as applied" was an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech, 
press, and religion.84 On the day that the Court decided Douglas, 
the ordinance as applied was held unconstitutional on the same 
grounds in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,85 which decided a number of 
appeals from convictions under the ordinance for conduct substan-
tially identical to that in Douglas. 
Douglas held that the complaint clearly stated a claim under the 
Civil Rights Act,86 but that equitable relief was "in the discretion 
of the court"87 and should be withheld if sought on "slight or in-
consequential grounds,"88 particularly where it might "interfere 
with or embarrass"89 state proceedings. Since the Court had just 
held the ordinance, as applied, unconstitutional, it refused to enjoin 
threatened prosecutions. The Court felt that the ruling in Murdock 
had, in effect, removed the threat to speech activities. "There is 
no allegation here and no proof that respondents would not, nor 
can we assume that they will not, acquiesce in the decision of this 
Court holding the challenged ordinance unconstitutional as applied 
to petitioners."90 
. The "hands off" attitude grew mushroomlike out of Douglas, and 
it still grows in spite of the specific language in Dombrowski: "We 
hold the abstention doctrine is inappropriate for cases such as the 
present one where, unlike Douglas v. City of Jeanette, statutes are 
justifiably attacked on their face as abridging free expression, or 
as applied for the purpose of discouraging protected activities."91 
81 Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959). 
82 Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985 (E.D.N.Y. 1966). 
83 319 U.S. 157 (1943). 
84 Id. at 159. 
85 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
86 Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 162 (1943). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 163. 
90 Id. at 165. 
91 380 U.S. at 489. See Boyer, supra note 2, at 78, 81: "In recent years, 
the abstention doctrine has been increasingly used by the district courts as 
a means of deferring or avoiding the distasteful task of enforcing federal 
law opposed by the local community. . . . Douglas continues to be invoked 
by those who would restrict or eliminate the role of the federal courts from 
aggressive state action." 
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Dombrowski stands as a basic policy change from Douglas92 and 
other more recent first amendment cases.93 The Court has realized 
that the delay inherent in the abstention doctrine is at the heart of 
the "irreparable harm" caused to speech activities. "[W] e have, in 
effect, avoided making vindication of freedom of expression await 
the outcome of protracted litigation."94 Dombrowski dealt with 
plaintiff's allegations separately. Abstention was held inappropri-
ate when a prosecution is attacked as being initiated and con-
ducted to discourage protected activities.05 In this situation, a con-
stitutional interpretation of a statute by the state court is not 
needed because the validity of the statute is unrelated to the na-
ture of the attack on the prosecution. Even if the statute is clearly 
constitutional, this "would not alter the impropriety of appellees' 
invoking the statute in bad faith to impose continued harassment 
in order to discourage appellants' activities."96 
It is the nature of the prosecution-including the purpose for 
which it is initiated and conducted-not the constitutionality of 
the statute under which it is initiated that creates the harm under 
this wing of the Dombrowski decision.07 This is consistent with 
dictum in Douglas which indicated that no person is immune from 
prosecution in "good faith" for his alleged criminal acts.98 Justice 
Stone in Douglas specifically referred to Hague v. CIO,99 "where 
local officials forcibly broke up meetings of the complainants and 
in many instances forcibly deported them from the state without 
trial,"10o as an instance where equitable relief would be justified 
because officials were not acting in good faith. Considerations of 
92 Boyer, supra note 2, at 86; Brewer, supra note 2, at 88. 
93 See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), where the Supreme 
Court abstained from meeting an attack on the constitutionality of statutes 
characterized by the district court as "parts of the general plan of massive 
resistance to the integration of schools." The Court emphasized the avoid-
ance of unnecessary interference by federal courts with proper and validly 
administered state concerns, and a possible state court interpretation which 
would avoid the constitutional question. rd. at 176, 177. See also, Albert-
son v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953); Musser v. utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948). 
94 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965). For example, the 
judgment on the merits in Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), was 
reached almost seven years after the institution of litigation. See also the 
extensive litigation leading to Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). 
05 380 U.S. at 490. 
96 rd. See Cox v. Louisiana, 348 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1965); NAACP 
v. Thompson, 357 F.2d 831, 833 (5th Cir. 1966). 
97 It is possible that use of a patently invalid statute, or one previously 
declared unconstitutional as applied to the same or similar circumstances, 
would be an "indicia" of bad faith. See Aelony v. Pace, 8 RACE REL. L. 
REP. 1355 (M.D. Ga. 1963); Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 
1966). Both cases involve the use of a statute declared unconstitutional in 
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937). 
98 Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943). 
99 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
100 Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943). 
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comity have never included allowing a bad faith prosecution to 
proceed unimpeded. Comity, which presumes that state courts will 
function in good faith and give paramount consideration to pro-
tecting first amendment rights, cannot prevent interference in 
state proceedings when an attack on those very presumptions is 
established. 
Whereas the nature of the prosecution, rather than the constitu-
tionality of the statute, is crucial in the bad faith attack, the oppo-
site is true in the vagueness attack. Here, regardless of the good 
faith and diligence of the state prosecutor or available procedures 
in state courts,t°l it is the dangers inherent in the vague statute 
that makes abstention inappropriate. 
In these circumstances, to abstain is to subject those af-
fected to the uncertainties and vagaries of criminal prose-
cution, whereas the reasons for the vagueness doctrine in 
the area of expression demand no less than freedom from 
prosecution prior to a construction adequate to save the 
statute. In such cases, abstention is at war with the pur-
poses of the vagueness doctrine, which demands appropri-
ate federal relief regardless of the prospects for expediti-
ous determination of state criminal prosecutions.102 
"Well intentioned prosecutors and judicial safeguards do not neu-
tralize the vice of a vague law."103 
The policies underlying abstention go directly to protecting the 
integrity of the state judicial process, either in reality or image. 
There is no question that a functioning, viable federalism re-
qUires a series of state court systems which are entitled to the 
confidence of the people.104 But when first amendment freedoms 
"of transcendent value to all society"105 require immediate pro-
tection,106 and it is likely that the lowest state court would view 
protection of these freedoms as impairing the integrity of that court 
or some local policy,t°7 it is essential that the federal trial forum be 
101 Many district court opinions cite availability of state procedures as 
a reason for abstaining from decision or for withholding relief. However, 
it should be clear that unless the entire constitutional challenge can be 
avoided in a "single state proceeding" by a decision on an independent 
issue of state law, the availability of state procedures and remedies is irrel-
evant to the federal remedy. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), 
McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963). It should be noted that 
in Dombrowski, the Orleans Parish District Court had summarily vacated 
the first arrest and search warrants. This availability of state remedies, 
and demonstration of "good faith" by the state court, did not in any way 
bar federal relief. 
102 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 492 (1965). 
103 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373 (1964). 
104 The "comity" principle operates on the presumption that the state 
courts have, and are entitled to have, this "confidence" of the people. 
105 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
106 See Brewer, supra note 2, at 88; Boyer, supra note 2, at 86. 
107 See Brewer, supra note 2, at 85; Boyer, supra note 93, at 85. 
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available for immediate relief. Where delay is the very evil to be 
prevented, abstention in favor of a procedure which promotes delay 
is totally inappropriate. !Os 
It appears therefore, that the various burdens of a criminal prose-
cution cannot be imposed on an individual or class raising 
either of the two Dombrowski challenges. If a requirement of 
Douglas is that the criminal proceeding be brought "lawfully and in 
good faith,"109 an exception to Douglas exists when the criminal 
proceeding is brought in bad faith. To require a defendant to go 
through the entire proceeding to challenge its existence merely 
compounds the "chilling effect" which the Court wishes to pre-
vent.110 In a prosecution under a vague or overbroad statute, the 
process of "hammering out the structure of the statute piece-
meal"111 (as is inevitable in a prosecution where the court must 
deal "with only a narrow portion of the prohibition at anyone 
time"112) cannot obviate the unconstitutional uncertainty for per-
sons other than the defendant. 
III. THE FIRST VARIATION: CAMERON v. JOHNSON 
The next case to raise some of the Dombrowski issues was 
Cameron v. Johnson.1l3 While Dombrowski floundered in the dis-
trict court in Louisiana, Cameron fared no better before a three 
lOS See Lusky, supra note 34, at 1164, where he states: 
[D]elay for its own sake-obstructionism-violates the pivotal com-
pact of the open society, the terms of which are: ungrudging accept-
ance of the present law in return for effective access to the processes 
of orderly change. Such violation destroys faith in those processes 
and constitutes a direct invitation to "self-help," that is, the achieve-
ment of desired objectives by force or illegal pressure tactics. Self-
help is the negation of civil order; and if employed on a broad scale, 
it brings on the pervasive coercion of the police state. 
109 Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943). 
110 A colleague, who insists upon anonymity, suggests a colorful, if not 
altogether valid, analogy. If a doctor prescribes heart surgery for a patient 
when, in fact, heart surgery is completely inappropriate, it is of little com-
fort to the patient to be told that the doctor will use only the best surgical 
procedures, and will proceed in good faith. 
111 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965). 
112 Id. 
113 381 U.S. 741 (1965).· Two earlier cases presenting certain of the 
issues raised in Cameron were Baines v. Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir: 
1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 939 (1965); and Wells v. Hand, 238 F. Supp. 
779 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Wells v. Reynolds, 382 U.S. 39 
(1965). Baines refused to find 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) an exception to 28 
U.S.C. § 2283 (1964). Wells abstained as to a Georgia statute subsequently 
held unconstitutional in Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 
1966). See Bailey, supra note 2, at 93; Comment, Theories of Federalism 
and Civil Rights, 75 YALE L.J. 1007, 1035 (1966). 
• After this article was written, the Supreme Court issued its second 
opinion in Cameron v. Johnson, 36 U.S.L.W. 4319 (April 22, 1968), on ap-
peal from the district court's decision on remand. See the author's Closing 
Note at the conclusion of this article. 
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judge panel in Mississippi.114 Reverend Cameron, leader of a voter-
registration drive, had sought a declaratory judgment against the 
Mississippi Unlawful Picketing statute,115 and an injunction against 
prosecution under this statute. The statute was passed unani-
mously by the Mississippi Legislature on April 8, 1964, after a 10 
week picketing campaign by Negro Mississippians to enforce their 
constitutional right to register and vote. Reverend Cameron was 
threatened with arrest on April 9, and on April 10, he, along with 
"forty-odd other persons," was arrested116 and state court prosecu-
tions were begun. The federal action was initiated three days after 
the arrests. 
Plaintiffs alleged both that the plan, purpose, or design1l7 in the 
passage and enforcement of the statute was to "discourag[e] 
protected activities,"118 and that it was unconstitutionally vague 
and overbroad.l19 The court considered the "bad faith" attack on 
the merits and found "that there was no such plan, or purpose, or 
design or intendment of [the statute],"120 and that the state was 
prosecuting plaintiffs "in good faith." It refused, however, to deter-
mine the statute's constitutionality.121 
The court felt abstention appropriate on the vagueness and 
overbreadth attack for a number of reasons. First, "the courts of 
Mississippi have not construed the Act . . . ."122 Second, plaintiffs 
had an "effective and efficient statutory remedy ... available to 
them"123 in the state courts. Third, "petitioner has invoked the 
jurisdiction of the state court ... by filing a motion to quash the 
affidavits on the ground that the Act is unconstitutional"124 and 
this indicates an adequate remedy at law. Even though the 
court states that these reasons support abstention, it strongly indi-
cated that, in its view, the statute is constitutiona1.125 This, in 
fact, appeared to be the real ground for the decision to abstain. 
Judge Rives in dissent spoke solely to the vagueness attack: 
In my opinion, the statute is so clearly unconstitutional 
that this case is hardly one "required ... to be heard and 
determined by a district court of three judges .... " On 
114 Cameron v. Johnson, 244 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Miss. 1964). This first 
district court opinion is referred to in the text as Cameron I. 
115 MIss. CODE ANN. § 2318.5 (1964). The law is often referred to as 
House Bill 546, Mississippi Laws, 1964. 
116 Cameron v. Johnson, 244 F. Supp. 846, 856 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (Rives, 
dissenting) . 
117 Id. at 848. 
118 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490 (1965). 
119 Cameron v. Johnson, 244 F. Supp. 846, 850 (S.D. Miss. 1964). 
120 Id. at 848. 
121 Id. at 848, 849, 851. 
122 Id. at 848. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 854. 
125 Id. at 851, 855. 
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the subject of abstention, I need not repeat in this dissent 
the argument contained in my dissenting opinion in Bailey 
v. Patterson .... 126 
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On April 26, 1965, the Supreme Court decided Dombrowski, and 
on June 7, 1965, issued the now famous per curiam order in 
Cameron. 
Appellants brought this action, inter alia, under 42 U.S.C. 
§1983 (1958 ed.), to enjoin enforcement of the Mississippi 
Anti-Picketing statute, on the grounds that it was an un-
constitutionally broad regulation of speech, and that it 
was being applied for the purpose of discouraging appel-
lants' civil rights activities. 
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is 
granted. The judgment is vacated and the cause remanded 
for reconsideration in light of Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 
U.S. 479. On remand, the District Court should first con-
sider whether 28 U.S.C. §2283 (1958 ed.) bars a federal 
injunction in this case, see 380 U.S. at 484, n.2. If §2283 
is not a bar, the court should then determine whether re-
lief is proper in light of the criteria set forth in Dom-
browski.127 
The Supreme Court's opinion is interesting, not only for the sup-
port the remand order seems to give to Dombrowski's vitality, but 
for Justice Black's dissenting opinion arguing, it seems, for a se-
verely limited Dombrowski.128 Justice Black's dissent deserves 
more than casual mention because his interpretation has since 
been applied by a number of three judge panels,129 and because 
Cameron is again before the Supreme Court.130 It is therefore 
likely that Black's theory will soon be put to the test. 
Black is convinced that the Unlawful Picketing statute is con-
stitutional. He sees no reason for the remand, feeling that the 
Court should decide the issues before it rather than delay adjudi-
cation further. l31 He also refuses to accept any argument that the 
statute is vague or overbroad.132 However, the Supreme Court had 
not decided Dombrowski when the district court rendered its 
decision in Cameron U 33 To allow the lower court to reconsider its 
decision in light of Dombrowski, therefore, is consistent with an 
unstated premise of Dombrowski that it is the district court, not 
126 Id. at 858 (Rives, dissenting). See Bailey v. Patterson, 199 F. Supp. 
595 (S.D. Miss. 1961), vacated and remanded, 369 U.S. 31 (1962). 
127 381 U.S. at 741. 
128 Id. at 742 (dissenting opinion). 
129 Brooks v. Briley, 274 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967); Zwicker v. 
Boll, 270 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Wis. 1967); Cameron v. Johnson, 262 F. Supp. 
873 (S.D. Miss. 1966). This district court opinion is referred to in the 
opinion as Cameron II. 
130 Prob. juris. noted, 389 U.S. 809 (1967). 
131 Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 752 (1965) (dissenting opinion). 
132 Id. at 745, 749-50. 
133 See note 114 supra. 
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the Supreme Court, that is to bear primary responsibility in these 
cases.134 Further, with one judge in the district court dissenting on 
the validity of the statute, it was not unrealistic to assume that a 
declaration of the statute's invalidity might be rendered on re-
mand. The two abstaining judges would now have to deal directly 
with the constitutionality issue. 
Judge Rives is just as certain that the statute is unconstitutional 
as Justice Black is that it is valid.135 Black's statement that hold-
ing the statute unconstitutional "somehow takes away from the 
States" the right "to control their streets and ingress and egress to 
and from their public buildings"136 overstates the issue. The issue, 
of course, is not whether the state has such power, but whether the 
Unlawful Picketing statute was a constitutional exercise of that 
power.lS7 
More difficult to understand than his feeling that the statute is 
valid, is Justice Black's apparent misreading of both the lower court 
opinion in Cameron and the Supreme Court decision in Dombrow-
ski. Justice Black states, 
We understand from the District Court's opinion and con-
clusions of law that it did not dismiss the complaint on the 
ground that it thought it necessary to have the state 
courts construe the statute, but rather on the ground that 
having found the statute constitutional it dismissed in 
order for the criminal cases to be tried in the state courts.13S 
Although, as previously indicated, Cameron I made several state-
ments supporting the constitutionality of the statute, it specifi-
cally holds, 
In this case it is not necessary to pass on the constitution-
ality of this Act, even though there can be slight doubt as to 
its constitutionality, and where it is rather clear that it is 
constitutional, the Courts lean to a doctrine hereinbefore 
announced of abstention until it is passed upon by the 
courts of the State.13D 
And further, "Weare of the opinion that under the law and the 
facts of this case it is the duty of the Federal Courts to abstain and 
permit the plaintiffs to pursue their state remedies, as they have 
already commenced to do."140 The district court goes to great 
134 Lusky, supra note 34, at 1178-84, 1191; Wisdom, The Frictionmaking, 
Exacerbating Political Role of Federal Courts, 21 Sw. L.J. 411 (1967). 
135 Cameron v. Johnson, 244 F. Supp. 846, 858 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (dis-
senting opinion). 
136 Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 751 (1965). 
137 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Cameron v. Johnson, 244 
F. Supp. 846, 857-58 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (dissenting opinion). 
138 Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 745 n.6 (1965) (emphasis added). 
Black did not participate in Dombrowski. 
13D Cameron v. Johnson, 244 F. Supp. 846, 851 (1964) (emphasis added). 
140 Id. at 855-56. 
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length to discuss Supreme Court abstention cases to support its 
viewY 1 Justice Black finds what is hinted at but is not there: a 
holding that the statute is constitutional. 
Black's view of Dombrowski is that, rather than allowing injunc-
tive relief if either a vague or overbroad statute or a prosecution 
initiated to deter free speech is established, relief should be forth-
coming only where both evils are present. Dombrowski approved 
injunctions against vague statutes affecting speech, he says, only 
"where it was also alleged that the statute was part of a plan 'to 
employ arrests, seizures, and threats of prosecution' under the stat-
ute in a way that would discourage"142 the assertion of constitu-
tional rights. He goes on to state that, "This Court in Dombrow-
ski held, as I read the opinion, that an injunction against any en-
forcement of any kind of the state statute ... could issue there 
only because . . . there were threats of prosecution purely to har-
rass .... "143 This interpretation would severely restrict its appli-
cation.144 
Dombrowski clearly holds abstention inappropriate where "stat-
utes are justifiably attacked on their face as abridging free expres-
sion or as applied for the purpose of discouraging protected ac-
tivities."145 If one attack or the other is sufficient to require a de-
cision on the merits, certainly some relief was intended to be 
forthcoming should plaintiffs prevail. And in determining the 
presence of "irreparable harm" so as to support injunctive relief, 
the two evils must be analyzed separately. 
As previously discussed,146 the chilling of first amendment ac-
tivities springs differently from the two evils. The more certain it 
appears that a prosecution is for the bad faith purpose of deterring 
free speech or assembly, the less relevant is the constitutionality of 
the statute under which the prosecution is proceeding. In this 
situation, "it is obvious that defense in a state criminal prosecution 
will not suffice to avoid irreparable injury."147 It is not difficult 
for an even slightly sophisticated prosecutor to avoid facially in-
valid laws, but still accomplish his insidious purpose of stifling 
speech activities. 148 Whether the local government's hostility 
against a person is a result of his race, his religion, or his political 
views, requiring the presence of a facially invalid statute as a pre-
141 [d. at 852-55. 
142 Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 748 (1965). See Comment, supra 
note 113, at 1034, whose author seems to feel that Black's theory is the 
appropriate one, although recognizing that Dombrowski held otherwise. 
143 381 U.S. at 748. 
144 See 1966 DUKE L.J. 219, 232. 
145 380 U.S. at 489-90 (emphasis added). 
146 See text accompanying notes 29-62 supra. See note 2 supra. 
147 Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 755 (1965) (dissenting opinion). 
148 For a description of the trend in Mississippi, see Lusky, supra note 
34, at 1168-70. 
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requisite to considering the attack on the legitimacy of state action 
emasculates the basic concept of immediate federal protection for 
first amendment freedoms. 
On the other hand, the more vague, indefinite, and overbroad a 
statute is, the more likely people desiring to speak out will be 
silenced by the language of the statute itself, regardless of the atti-
tudes or actions of state officials in starting a prosecution. Fur-
ther, the more vague the statute, the more likely that a court, 
prosecutor, or policeman will be acting with the honest belief that 
a violation of the statute has in fact occurred. One evil of a vague 
or overbroad statute is that, by its terms, it allows too wide a scope 
of application by those with the duty of charging violations. 
It will not do to say that a prosecutor's sense of fairness 
and the Constitution would prevent a successful . . . pros-
ecution for some of the activities seemingly embraced 
within the sweeping statutory definitions. The hazard of 
being prosecuted for knowing but guiltless behavior re-
mains .... Well-intentioned prosecutors and judicial safe-
guards do not neutralize the vice of a vague law.149 
Justice Black's requirement that both evils be present to justify 
injunctive relief would severely constrict the broadened concept of 
"irreparable harm" worked out by the Court in Dombrowski and 
other recent cases.150 
In Cameron 1]151 the district court reaffirmed that the prosecu-
tions were in "good faith," held the statute constitutional, and found 
that section 2283 barred relief as to the pending prosecutions, with 
section 1983 being no exception. Judge Rives again dissented/52 
reiterating his earlier view that section 1983 is an exception to sec-
tion 2283, and that "the statute is ... clearly unconstitutional."153 
He added that the evidentiary record "clearly shows that section 
2318.5 [the Unlawful Picketing statute] was unconstitutionally 
applied."154 
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in Cameron II, 
and will now hopefully resolve two of the key "unsettled" Dom-
browski problems. First, does section 2283 (the Anti-Injunction 
statute) bar relief sought under the Civil Rights Act?155 To the 
149 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373 (1964). 
150 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Baggett v. BUl-
!itt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1962); United 
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 
(1959); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
151 Cameron v. Johnson, 262 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Miss. 1966). 
152 Id. at 881-97. 
153 Id. at 882. 
154 Id. at 890. 
165 The Anti-Injunction statute is 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964). The Civil 
Rights Act is 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). See Cameron v. Johnson, 36 U.S.L.W. 
4319, 4320 n.3 (April 22, 1968), and the author's Closing Note at the end 
of this article. 
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extent that Dombrowski considers abstention inappropriate in cer-
tain first amendment cases, it would appear unlikely that section 
2283, which is the legislative embodiment of the comity doctrine 
repudiated by Dombrowski, could be allowed to stand as a bar to 
relief without substantially destroying the Dombrowski remedy.156 
Dombrowski found abstention inappropriate when a bad faith or 
facial invalidity attack is appropriately alleged prior to initiation of 
a prosecution. Cameron will decide the propriety of abstention sub-
sequent to the initiation of a prosecution. 
Second, assuming the Court finds that section 2283 does not 
bar consideration of plaintiffs' claims on their merits, it may have 
to deal with Justice Black's thesis that both evils are necessary 
to warrant injunctive relief. If the Unlawful Picketing statute is 
found unconstitutional, but the Court accepts the lower court's 
finding of no bad faith, will relief be forthcoming? And should 
the Court find that the Mississippi legislature and prosecuting of-
ficials used an otherwise valid statute to destroy plaintiffs' con-
stitutionally protected picketing, will relief be granted? 
IV. MULTIPLE VARIATIONS: THE Two CAMPS 
Since Dombrowski, and even more so since Black's dissent in 
Cameron, district courts have placed themselves into two camps 
that are opposed in philosophy of federalism and in decisions. The 
following quotations are from cases which were decided four days 
apart in late October 1967 and which involved similar fact situations 
and attacks on statutes. 
There is no showing of irreparable injury which is requi-
site to justify federal equitable relief, or of the special cir-
cumstances that would warrant federal disruption of the 
normal pattern of raising constitutional defenses in the 
course of the state criminal proceedings. . .. If the chal-
lenged laws are void for vagueness or overbreadth, the 
state courts are fully capable of so ruling.157 
Any unconstitutional statute, attempting to regulate First 
Amendment rights, which has been invoked, or as here, in 
reasonable anticipation of future events will be invoked, 
against a member of society, does, in and of itself, result in 
a suppression of constitutional rights, i.e., "chilling effect." 
Accordingly, we find ourselves unable to invoke the ab-
stention doctrine as urged upon us by the defendants, and 
therefore take jurisdiction of this case under the authority 
expressed in Dombrowski v. Pfister.158 
156 The history and analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964), and its relation 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), has been detailed in numerous articles. See 
particularly, H. HART & M. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 1075-78 (1953); Bailey, supra note 2, at 122-24; Boyer, supra note 
2, at 66-72, 88-96; Brewer, supra note 2, at 97-103; 50 VA. L. REV. 1404 
(1964) . 
157 Brooks v. Briley, 274 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967). 
158 Baker v. Binder, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967). 
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The first, reminiscent of Douglas, is typical of those courts still 
reluctant to affirmatively protect first amendment freedoms. The 
latter, citing and implementing Dombrowski, is indicative of those 
courts now eager, in appropriate circumstances, to aggressively 
and quickly vindicate state infringement on those same freedoms. 
While it seems clear that Dombrowski's mandate makes the eager 
courts correct and the reluctant courts in error, the eager courts 
often fail to deal adequately with the abstention and anti-injunc-
tion statute problems which the reluctant courts overemphasize, 
and even misuse, to justify avoiding decision. The views of these 
two camps must confront each other squarely or federal relief may 
continue to turn on the federal district in which one happens to 
file suit. 
A. The Reluctant Courts 
Zwickler v. Koota159 and Zwicker v . .BolF60 ride tandem in more 
ways than the similarity of plaintiffs' names. Different facets of 
a number of crucial "unsettled" issues, as well as the replay of some 
supposedly "settled" ones, are presented. 
1. ZWICKLER V. KOOTA 
During the 1966 congressional campaign, Sanford Zwickler de-
sired to distribute unsigned political leaflets attacking a local con-
gressman. Section 781-b of the New York Penal Law makes such 
action a criminal offense. No prosecution had been started against 
Zwickler for his 1966 activities, and none had been affirmatively 
threatened at the time that he initiated a federal action. He based 
his apprehension of "threatened prosecution" on the fact that dur-
ing the 1964 political campaign he had distributed the same un-
signed leaflet, and was charged and convicted of a violation of sec-
tion 781-b.l6l Zwickler alleged that section 781-b was unconstitu-
tionally vague and overbroad. He further alleged that he desired to 
distribute leaflets as he did in 1964, but that District Attorney 
Koota "intends or will again prosecute the plaintiff for his . . . 
acts of distribution."162 
The district court found Zwickler's vagueness and overbreadth 
attack to be "not clearly frivolous," but refused to find that there 
was an imminently threatened prosecution under the statute. The 
159 261 F. Supp. 985 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), re?id and remanded, 389 U.S. 241 
(1967). 
160 270 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Wis. 1967). 
161 The conviction was ultimately reversed for insufficient evidence, 
without reaching the constitutional challenges. People v. Zwickler, (Sup. 
Ct., Kings Co., April 23, 1965), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 1069, 266 N.Y.S.2d 140, 213 
N.E.2d 467 (1965). 
162 Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985, 992 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd and 
remanded, 389 U.S. 241 (1967). 
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court suggested that the suit was premature. Plaintiff's defense to 
any prosecution which may come would assure him "adequate vin-
dication of his alleged constitutional rights."163 In fact, in empha-
sizing the adequacy of state remedies, and therefore the absence 
of that imminent harm which requires the federal court to face 
the issues, the lower court indicated that if Zwickler did not want 
to await the possible prosecution, he could "if he desires, institute 
an action in the state court for a declaratory judgment."164 
The Supreme Court reversed in Koota165 as it had in Baggett, 
Dombrowski, and Cameron. It found a key confusion in the lower 
court's opinion. "Dombrowski teaches that the questions of absten-
tion and of injunctive relief are not the same."166 Abstention is 
inappropriate in cases where statutes are justifiably attacked on 
their face as abridging free expression.167 The Supreme Court spe-
cifically spells out what was not clearly articulated in Dombrow-
ski. If the appropriate allegations are made, the federal court must 
deal with the issues, not abstain and refer them to the state court. 
The district court's suggestion that Zwickler file a declaratory judg-
ment action in the state court is contrary to the mandates of Bag-
gett, Dombrowski, and now Koota. In Baggett the court rejected 
the idea that plaintiff had the burden to file a state declaratory 
judgment suit. In Dombrowski the court affirmatively held that 
the burden was on the state to seek clarification of a facially 
vague and overbroad statute in the state court before the statute 
can be used.16s Now in Koota, it offers the plaintiff the alterna-
tive of a federal suit. And if that alternative is chosen, Koota 
requires a decision on the merits. 
In ... expanding federal judicial power, Congress imposed 
the duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary to give due 
respect to a suitor's choice of a federal forum for the hear-
ing and decision of his federal constitutional claims. 
It was error to refuse to pass on appellant's claim for a 
declaratory judgment.161l 
Koota isolates another issue. There is a difference in the re-
qUirements for obtaining declaratory rather than injunctive relief. 
The Court requires two different burdens of proof for the two 
types of relief. "Irreparable harm" need not be established to ob-
tain declaratory relief. "It will be the task of the District Court 
163 261 F. Supp. at 992. 
164 Id. at 993. 
165 389 U.S. 241 (1967). 
166 Id. at 254. 
167 Id. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 601 n.9 (1967); 
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489-90 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 
U.S. 360 (1964). 
16S 380 U.S. at 491. 
169 389 U.S. at 248, 252. 
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on the remand to decide whether an injunction will be 'necessary 
or appropriate' should appellant's prayer for declaratory relief pre-
vail."170 Although Dombrowski's broadened interpretation of "ir-
reparable harm" in first amendment cases brings these two burdens 
of proof closer together, it remains to be seen how much more 
harm must be shown, if any, after the issuance of a declaratory 
judgment, to warrant an injunction.l7l 
The delineation of a difference between the requirements for 
declaratory and injunctive relief also raises an interesting possibil-
ity concerning Justice Black's views in Cameron. Black indicated 
that to obtain "an injunction against the enforcement of any kind of 
a state statute,"172 both a vague or overbroad statute and a plan to 
harrass speech activities must be established. But Zwickler, rather 
than alleging prosecutorial abuse, alleged instead that Koota was 
a "diligent and conscientious public officer" who, "pursuant to his 
duties intends or will again prosecute the plaintiff for his [in-
tended] acts of distribution."173 
Although the issue of whether one or both evils is required for 
declaratory relief is not reached by the Supreme Court in Koota, 
Black's concurrence in the remand portends that perhaps he is will-
ing to allow declaratory relief if either Dombrowski evil is estab-
lished, and only requires both for injunctive relief. A "bad faith" 
prosecution may be the additional "harm" Justice Black would 
require.174 
2. ZWICKER V. BOLL 
Zwicker v. BolP75 presents many of the same problems as Koota, 
but in a different posture. First, whereas in Koota one issue was 
170 rd. at 255 (emphasis added). 
171 One possibility would be that the plaintiff would have to show that 
the state courts were not acting pursuant to the declaratory judgment. If 
the state proceeded with pending prosecutions, or initiated new prosecu-
tions, under the statute declared unconstitutional, injunctive relief would 
be warranted. This is the assumption upon which the courts in Douglas v. 
City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Baker v. Binder, 274 F. Supp. 658 
(W.D. Ky. 1967); Ware v. Nichols, 266 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Miss. 1967) 
proceeded. 
172 Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 748 (1965) (emphasis added). 
173 Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985, 988 (E.D.N.Y. 1966). The dis-
trict court found this allegation inadequate to support either declaratory 
or injunctive relief against the statute attacked as vague and overbroad, 
because "there is no suggestion that the alleged threatened prosecution of 
the plaintiffs will be undertaken in bad faith." The lower court therefore 
extended Black's view on injunctive relief to a request for declaratory re-
lief as well. This is not the Supreme Court's view, however. 
174 Assuming on remand that the suit is not declared moot, see Zwickler 
v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252-253, nn.15-16 (1967), the district court may have 
to directly meet the issue of whether a bad faith prosecution, in addition 
to a vague or overbroad statute, is a necessary element for declaratory, as 
opposed to injunctive, relief. 
175 270 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Wis. 1967). 
NUMBER 2] FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 395 
whether the suit had been filed too early, the plaintiffs in BoH 
(according to the district court) filed their suit too late, since the 
misdemeanor prosecutions already had begun and not-guilty pleas 
had been entered. Second, in Koota there had not been a consti-
tutional interpretation of the statute in question by the state's 
highest court, and the district court stated this as a reason for ab-
sention.176 In Boll, there had been a state supreme court inter-
pretation of the statute in question, and the district court abstained 
on the ground that the constitutional issue had already been re-
solved in favor of the statute.177 
BoH arose out of the arrest of 19 antiwar demonstrators on the 
University of Wisconsin Madison campus. State criminal com-
plaints were filed shortly after arrest charging them with dis-
orderly conduct. All were immediately arraigned and pleaded not 
guilty. Prior to trial, a Dombrowski-type complaint was filed al-
leging prosecution in bad faith and prosecution under a vague and 
overbroad statute. As in Dombrowski, the panel never held an 
evidentiary hearing, but only heard legal arguments on the vague-
ness attack. The court, in a two to one decision, dismissed the 
suit without reaching any substantive issue, indicating they would 
abstain since the issues were appropriate for decision in the state 
criminal proceeding. 
The decision of the court stated that "[a]pplying common sense 
principles of comity to the existing situation, I find no compelling 
reason why this court should assert power to decide these issues in 
this action."178 The court avoided the question of whether section 
1983 is an exception to section 2283, stating that "it is not neces-
sary" to make such a determination.179 The concurring judge 
rested his abstention primarily on the dictates of section 2283, al-
though stating agreement with the court's opinion. 
In my view an act of Congress, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, even 
when read together with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, forbids this court 
from staying the state court actions, and impliedly, at 
least admonishes us, if it does not prohibit us from super-
seding, in effect, the state court resolution of these federal 
issues by issuing a declaratory judgment.180 
An important difference between BoH and Koota is that in Boll 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin had met a vagueness attack on the 
disorderly conduct statute by declaring it constitutional' in State 
v. Givens.181 Therefore, the rationale that the federal court should 
176 261 F. Supp. at 992-93. 
177 The Wisconsin Supreme Court found the disorderly conduct statute 
challenged in Boll to be not unconstitutionally vague in State v. Givens, 28 
Wis. 2d 109, 135 N.W.2d 780 (1965). 
178 Zwicker v. Boll, 270 F. Supp. 131, 134 (w.n. Wis. 1967). 
179 rd. at 136. 
180 rd. at 137 (concurring opinion). 
181 28 Wis. 2d 109, 135 N.W.2d 780 (1965). 
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abstain when the highest state court has not had an opportunity 
to interpret the statute should have been inapplicable here. Yet 
the court in Boll abstained and sent the case back to the state for 
a "second bite," while the Supreme Court in Koota remanded for 
consideration on the merits in spite of the lack of a New York 
Court of Appeals interpretation of the statute. 
The Boll court badly confused three points. It failed to distin-
guish between the two distinct Dombrowski evils; it failed to rec-
ognize the difference between determining whether it will ab-
stain, and determining whether relief is appropriate; and it failed 
to understand the requirements for obtaining the two distinct types 
of relief requested-declaratory and injunctive. 
In failing to distinguish the vagueness and overbreadth attack 
from the prosecutorial abuse attack, the court showed the same 
confusion displayed by the lower court in Koota. Even under 
Black's narrowing conception of the problem, it is not disputed that 
there are two separate evils. Justice Black thinks both must be 
present to warrant injunctive relief; Dombrowski indicated either 
is sufficient. But the Boll court argued that it would abstain on 
the vagueness question because bad faith had not been estab-
lished. Further, the court continued, since the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court had already upheld the constitutionality of the statute, there 
was no need to consider it anew.182 
But any discussion of the failure to establish bad faith is irrele-
vant. The conduct of the plaintiffs/83 the motives and purposes 
of the state in pursuing the prosecution, and the availability of 
state procedures to raise the issues are all irrelevant under the 
vagueness and overbreadth wing of Dombrowski. Further, even if 
certain conduct were relevant, no evidentiary hearing was allowed, 
and factual conclusions were therefore inappropriate. It is pre-
cisely because the Wisconsin Supreme Court has upheld the stat-
ute in a former prosecution that Dombrowski requires federal de-
cision in this case. Justice Brennan said: 
Because of the sensitive nature of constitutionally pro-
tected expression, we have not required that all of those 
subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test 
their rights. . . . If the rule were otherwise, the contours 
of regulation would have to be hammered out case by case 
-and tested only by those hardy enough to risk criminal 
prosecution to determine the proper scope of regulation. 
.. Moreover, we have not thought that the improbabil-
182 270 F. Supp. at 135-36. 
183 When plaintiff's conduct appears from the indictments to be "hard 
core," i.e., conduct that would obviously be prohibited under any construc-
tion of the statute being attacked as vague, plaintiff may lose his stand-
ing to attack the statute in this collateral fashion. See Dombrowski v. 
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491-92 (1965); Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 
(N.D. Ga. 1967). 
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ity of successful prosecution makes the case different. The 
chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment 
rights may derive from the fact of the prosecution, unaf-
fected by the prospects of its success or faiZure. 184 
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Dombrowski's command that abstention is inappropriate in cer-
tain first amendment cases does not mean that the plaintiffs will 
necessarily prevail, or that if they prevail they will be entitled to 
injunctive relief. What it does mean is that the federal court, not 
the state court, has the duty to decide the first amendment issues. 
"Plainly, escape from that duty is not permissible merely because 
state courts also have the solemn responsibility, equally with the 
federal courts."185 Boll fails to recognize this difference. It seems 
to operate on the assumption that if the court foregoes abstention, 
plaintiffs have prevailed. But abstention goes to the exercise of 
jurisdiction, not to the granting of relief. 
We yet like to believe that wherever the Federal courts 
sit, human rights under the Federal Constitution are 
always a proper subject for adjudication, and that we 
have not the right to decline the exercise of that jurisdic-
tion simply because the rights asserted may be adjudicated 
in some other forum.186 
Finally, Koota makes clear that the requirements for declaratory 
and injunctive relief are distinct. Boll treats the requirements for 
each type of relief as identical. 
3. BROOKS v. BRILEY 
Brooks v. BriZey187 is the most recent case to accept Black's rea-
soning as persuasive. Plaintiffs, members and officers of the Stu-
dent Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), challenged the 
legitimacy of the prosecution of three of their members under 
various Tennessee statutes. The charges grew out of disturbances 
in Nashville, Tennessee. A full evidentiary hearing was held on 
plaintiffs' charge that officials of Nashville had purposely pro-
184 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491-92 (1965) (emphasis added). 
Givens considered only a vagueness attack on WIS. STAT. § 947.01 (1) (1963). 
See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). This was pointed 
up by the dissent in Zwicker v. Boll, 270 F. Supp. 131, 144 (W.D. Wis. 
1967). Zwickler v. Koota indicates that disposing of the "vagueness" attack 
does not meet the "overbreadth" attack. 
Appellant's challenge is not that the statute is void for vagueness, 
... [but rather] his constitutional attack is that the statute, although 
lacking neither clarity nor precision, is void for "overbreadth," that 
is, that it offends the constitutional principle that "a governmental 
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to 
state regulational may not be achieved by means which sweep unnec-
essarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." 
389 U.S. at 249-50. 
185 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967). 
186 Id. 
187 274 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967). 
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voked the violence which occurred and were now prosecuting them 
in bad faith. The court's characterization of the issue in the case 
telegraphs its decision: "[T] he action, basically, involves the right 
of state and municipal law enforcement authorities, including the 
local police, to cope effectively with a serious outbreak of violence 
and lawlessness without interference from the long arm of a fed-
eral injunction."188 In a lengthy decision, the court stated, 
we find to be devoid of factual support, and indeed even 
fanciful, the plaintiffs' charge that policemen and other 
officers and officials of the Metropolitan Government of 
Nashville, combined or conspired in bad faith to harass 
the plaintiffs and to deprive them of their constitu-
tionally protected rights.189 
The court also held that a class action could not be maintained 
and that it would abstain on the constitutionality of the challenged 
statutes, leaving the remaining individual plaintiffs to their crimi-
nal defense in the state courts.190 The court reasoned that bad 
faith on the part of the state, in prosecuting under a vague and 
overbroad statute, must be established before the court will con-
sider the vagueness challenge.19l 
The court further found no "chilling effect" on plaintiffs' exer-
cise of their rights of free speech arising from the vague statutes. 
As with "bad faith," the court considered irreparable harm as to 
the vagueness attack to be an objectively ascertainable series of 
facts, discoverable only through a perusal of the evidence. Since 
no such "harm" seems to have been demonstrated from the hear-
ing, the court abstained. 
Making the same mistake found in the district court decisions in 
Boll, Koota, and Dombrowski itself, the court in Brooks failed to 
understand Dombrowski's broadened interpretation of "irreparable 
harm"-that in the area of speech activities, injury is assumed from 
the existence of the vague statute. This misunderstanding led the 
court to indicate that state remedies, including defense of the 
criminal actions, will protect plaintiffs' rights. 
But even assuming that the plaintiffs in Brooks did not estab-
lish that they were entitled to relief, the court made the more 
basic error of abstaining. The court misinterpreted not only Dom-
browski, but Black's dissent in Cameron. Although Black feels 
prosecutorial abuse is necessary to injunctive relief, he clearly does 
not support abstention. Koota also made clear that the question 
of the quantity and quality of injury necessary to obtain an injunc-
tion is distinct from the question of the propriety of abstention. 
Further, since declaratory relief may be granted "irrespective of 
188 Id. at 541 (emphasis added). 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 549. 
191 Id. at 551. 
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... the propriety of an injunction,"102 a finding of "irreparable 
harm" is not only unnecessary to forego abstention, but may be 
unnecessary to obtain declaratory relief. 
B. The Eager Courts 
1. CARMICHAEL V. ALLEN 
On September 8, 1966, Stokely Carmichael, then Chairman of 
SNCC, was arrested in Atlanta, Georgia, on charges of riot and dis-
orderly conduct.103 On September 13 and 14, seventeen others, 
including seven SNCC workers, were charged with riot or "circu-
lating insurrectionary literature,"194 or both. 
On September 9, 1966, a federal suit was filed195 attacking the 
attempts to prosecute as "a bad faith effort to interfere with ad-
mitted rights by misuse of the state's criminal procedures,"196 a~d 
as based on vague and overbroad197 statutes. This latter attack was 
made on the Georgia insurrection and riot statutes and on the dis-
orderly conduct ordinance of Atlanta. 
In Carmichael, a three judge panel declared four sections of the 
insurrection statute and the entire disorderly conduct ordinance 
unconstitutional. Attempted or threatened prosecutions were en-
joined.10s The court abstained from determining the constitu-
tionality of the riot statute on the ground that "the conduct 
charged [in the indictment] would come within a possible permis-
sible constitutional construction of the statute by the state 
court,"199 obtainable in a single state proceeding. 
Since it found five of the laws unconstitutional, it only discussed 
the bad faith attack with regard to the riot statute. It held that 
allegations that the statute was being used in bad faith, "regard-
less of whether [it] ... is constitutional or not,"200 entitled the 
complaining parties to relief if true. The court concluded, how-
ever, after an evidentiary hearing, "that the plaintiffs have simply 
failed to carry this burden."201 
The Carmichael court clearly accepted the "double pronged at-
tack" of Dombrowski,202 and rejected Black's Cameron dissent. 
The vagueness attack alone, without regard to prosecutorial abuse, 
192 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254 (1967). 
193 The arrests were made under GA. CODE ANN. § 26-5302 (1953) and 
Atlanta Ordinance § 20-7. 
194 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-904 (1953). 
195 Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 (1965). 
196 Id. at 987. 
197 Id. 
19S Id. at 993-95. 
199 Id. at 996. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 997. 
202 Id. at 992. 
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entitled the plaintiffs to declaratory and injunctive relief from 
prosecutions under five of the laws. And only when the riot stat-
ute survived this first attack did the court go on to consider 
whether it was being applied in bad faith. The relief denied in 
Brooks as a "disruption of the delicate division of authority be-
tween federal and state governments," and an invitation "to dis-
respect for the law itself,"203 was granted in Carmichael as essential 
to the protection of that "delicate division of authority." 
2. WARE V. NICHOLS 
In October 1964, eight voter registration workers in Belzoni, 
Mississippi, were arrested and charged with criminal syndical-
ism.204 In Ware v. Nichols,205 the federal court struck down the 
entire statute as "so vague and overbroad as to violate the First 
Amendment rights read into state laws by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."206 Citing Dombrowski and Cameron, the court rejected de-
fendants' urgings to abstain "until the Supreme Court of Mis-
sissippi has construed the Criminal Syndicalism Act."207 The court 
responded simply, "In the circumstances this case presents, the ab-
stention doctrine is inappropriate."208 
Although declaring the Mississippi statute unconstitutional on 
its face, the court denied an injunction on the assumption that "the 
state and county officials will withhold any action to enforce the 
Act, until a final judgment is rendered. Should this case not be 
appealed or should the Supreme Court affirm our judgment on 
appeal, we may assume that the charges against the plaintiffs will 
be dismissed."209 The court, therefore, did not reach "the question 
of whether 28 U.S.C. 1343, 42 U.S.C. 1971, and 28 [sic] U.S.C. 1983 
are exceptions to 28 U.S.C. 2283, the federal anti-injunction stat-
ute."210 Like Douglas, it assumed that the declared invalidity of the 
statute removed the threat of prosecution and hence the need for 
an injunction. 
The Ware court not only accepted the Dombrowski two-pronged 
attack, but recognized the Koota distinction between declaratory 
and injunctive relief. The court did not seek "irreparable harm" 
in the facts of the case, as was sought by the district courts in 
203 274 F. Supp. at 552. 
204 MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 2066.5-01 to .5-06 (Supp. 1964). 
205 266 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Miss. 1967). 
206 Id. at 569. 
207 Id. at 566. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 569. 
210 Id. Judge Wisdom, concurring, would find all three sections to be 
exceptions to § 2283. In addition to agreeing that the statute is invalid, 
he would find that there had been prosecutorial abuse, since plaintiffs did 
"nothing more than express opposition to their subordinate place in soci-
ety." Id. 
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Boll, Koota, and Brooks, but reiterated that the threat of sanctions 
arising from the overbroad statute has a sufficient chilling effect 
to require immediate federal intervention in the form of a de-
claratory judgment. 
3. MCSURELY V. RATLIFF 
In the closest replay of Dombrowski to come before the courts, 
the McSurelys and the Bradens, officials and field organizers of 
the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc. (SCEF), and 
Joseph Mulloy, a field representative for Appalachian Volunteers, 
were arrested in Pike County, Kentucky, and charged with advo-
cating sedition and criminal syndicalism.211 A federal suit was 
brought on September 1, 1967, to enjoin the criminal proceed-
ings.212 In what must be considered the most exciting victory for a 
vigorous Dombrowski doctrine, the panel declared the pertinent 
section of the Kentucky sedition statute unconstitutional, and issued 
a permanent injunction against present or future prosecutions un-
der the statute. In its two page unpublished order, the court 
stated: "Being of the opinion that K.R.S. 432.040 is unconstitu-
tional, we find under the circumstances of this case that Dombrow-
ski v. Pfister is applicable and the doctrine of abstention is not 
applicable."213 
The court's opinion, issued several weeks after the order, found 
the statute clearly unconstitutional, and preempted by federal 
legislation. The court disposed of the defendants' assertions that 
the doctrine of abstention, as well as the prohibition of the anti-
injunction statute, barred relief. Abstention, the court felt, was 
precluded because a rehabilitation of the statute was impossible. 
The statute was so broad and sweeping that nothing short of re-
writing it could bring it within permissible constitutional limita-
tions.214 The anti-injunction statute was not a bar since, like in 
Dombrowski, an indictment had not been returned, and there-
211 All five were charged under Ky. REV. STAT. § 432.040 (1962). As in 
Dombrowski, plaintiffs' homes were searched at the time of their arrest 
and their libraries and official and personal files were seized and removed 
from the premises. The seized documents, like those seized from Domb-
rowski and others, were of great interest to a congressional committee. 
In this case, Senator McClellan's Subcommittee on Investigations immedi-
ately subpeonaed the seized documents from Ratliff. In the course of the 
proceedings to challenge the legitimacy of the subpeona, and the investi-
gation pursuant to which it was issued, the United States Supreme Court 
has twice restrained Ratliff from releasing the seized material pending a 
final decision on the challenges. McSurely v. Ratliff, 389 U.S. 949 (1967); 
McSurely v. Ratliff, 390 U.S. 914 (1968). 
212 McSurely v. Ratliff, Civil No. 1146 (E.D. Ky., Sept. 14, 1967). 
213 McSurely v. Ratliff, Order No. 1146 (E.D. Ky., Sept. 14, 1967). The 
order in McSurely was issued from the bench after only two hours of 
deliberation. 
214 In 1920 the Governor of Kentucky asserted that the law "goes far 
afield and far beyond syndicalism and sedition." Id. at 1. 
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fore no "proceeding" was pending in the state court at the time the 
federal suit was filed. 
The court, echoing Ware and Carmichael, found irreparable harm 
in the "sweeping application" of the statute, and required no factual 
support from the particular events of the case, although it care-
fully considered the allegations and supporting documents. If 
Dombrowski was meant to give an immediate remedy in the dis-
trict courts, McSurely implemented that mandate without reser-
vation. 
4. BAKER V. BINDER 
Four days after the Tennessee federal court had abstained on the 
issue of the constitutionality of several statutes in Brooks v. Bri-
ley,215 a three judge Kentucky panel decided Baker v. Binder.216 
The court declared three Kentucky statutes and three Louisville 
ordinances "unconstitutional and void."217 
"The thrust of the complaint [was] double edged in nature."218 
It asked for declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the 
statutes and ordinances, and for injunctive relief from their enforce-
ment against the plaintiffs on the ground that it was "carried forth 
by defendants with the specific purpose and resultant effect of sup-
pressing plaintiffs' peaceable protest against alleged racial discrimi-
nation in the sale and rental of housing in the city of Louisville, 
Kentucky."219 The facts disclosed the nature of demonstrations by 
the plaintiffs, the "heckling" by their opponents, and the conduct 
of the police.220 
The court found no proof of "selective enforcement," "police 
brutality," or "suppression of constitutional rights."221 The bad 
faith allegations were dismissed with these words: "Very frankly, 
we as a Court are at a loss to determine what the police could have 
done, or left undone, under the circumstances, with which the plain-
tiffs would have found no fault."222 In Brooks, a failure to estab-
lish bad faith was the basis on which the court abstained from 
considering the constitutional challenge to the statutes. But the 
separate wings of Dombrowski were clearly understood and applied 
in Baker. 
Thus it is apparent that, in the judgment of this Court, the 
plaintiffs, in all fairness and practicality, have no legiti-
mate complaint in this situation could we but find that 
all of the ordinances and statutes affecting freedom of 
215 See text accompanying notes 187-92 supra. 
216 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967). 
217 Id. at 661-64. 
218 Id. at 659. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 659-60. 
221 Id. at 660. 
222 Id. 
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expression in this litigation were constitutional. This we 
are unable to do as we find certain of them vague and 
overbroad, and of possible sweeping application.223 
403 
The basis for relief was found in the statutes' susceptibility of 
being used to suppress the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs, 
even though the court specifically found that they had not been so 
used in this case. Since the possible unconstitutional application, 
"in and of itself, [may] result in a suppression of constitutional 
rights, i.e., 'chilling effect' ... we find ourselves unable to invoke 
the abstention doctrine as urged upon us by the defendants."224 
As in Ware, the court issued declaratory judgments voiding the 
six laws, but refused an injunction on the assumption that if plain-
tiffs ultimately prevailed, the state would dismiss all charges. Un-
like Ware, however, the court specifically found "that the statutes 
relied upon by the plaintiffs as the basis of their cause of action 
[including section 1983] herein are exceptions to 28 U.SoC. 2283,"225 
and that the court had the power to grant injunctive relief if it 
became necessary. 
C. Strengths and Weaknesses 
We return to differences implicit in the quotations beginning 
this discussion of the two camps. We find the reluctant courts, in 
harking back to the Pullman-Douglas view, failing to recogt;lize 
three accommodations which have been made in the traditional 
balance between state and federal courts when first amendment 
activities are threatened. First, they incorrectly declare that the 
presence of a "bad faith" prosecution is essential to establish the 
irreparable harm necessary to support relief under the vagueness-
overbreadth attack on a statute. Boll and Brooks226 explicitly 
agree with Justice Black that 
an injunction against any enforcement of any kind of the 
state statute ... could issue there only because (1) there 
were threats of prosecutions purely to harrass, with no 
hope of ultimate success, [and] (2) the law was challenged 
as, and found to be on its face, an "overly broad and vague 
regulation of expression. . . ."227 
Carmichael, Baker, Ware, and McSurely, however, all accept the 
"two pronged" theory of Dombrowski. None of these cases re-
quired proof of a "bad faith use" of the vague statute. The feared 
chilling effect arising from the threatened prosecutions under the 
223 Id. (emphasis added) 0 
224 Id. 
225 Id. at 664. 
226 See also the district court opinions in Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F .. Supp. 
985 (EoD.N.Y. 1966); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Suppo 556 (E.D. La. 
1964); Baggett v. Bullitt, 215 F. Supp. 439 (WoD. Wash. 1963). 
227 Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 748 (1964). 
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statute was sufficient to support declaratory or injunctive relief. 
Second, the reluctant courts improperly abstain. Koota made 
crystal clear, if Dombrowski and Cameron did not, that an ap-
propriate attack on a statute touching first amendment activities as 
being, on its face, unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, is suf-
ficient to require a federal trial court to decide the issue on the 
merits. Other cases also require the foregoing of abstention when 
the attack is on the legitimacy of the conduct of state officials, 
whether in initiating a sham prosecution,228 intimidating Negroes 
from voter registration,229 or a myriad of other activities which 
infringe constitutionally protected federal rights.230 Yet the courts 
in Boll and Brooks found support, either in the common-law doc-
trines of comity and abstention, or in the anti-injunction statute, 
section 2283, for abstention in cases in which Dombrowski and 
Koota clearly dictate otherwise. 
The eager courts, however, uniformly reject the applicability of 
the abstention doctrine or the anti-injunction statute, either ex-
pressly or by implication, in granting relief. In all four cases, a 
prosecution had been instituted prior to the filing of the federal 
suit, but in one way or another, section 2283 was avoided. Baker 
expressly found the Civil Rights Act to be an "exception" to section 
2283. Carmichael and McSurely implicitly made this finding by 
granting injunctive relief against the pending prosecutions. In 
Carmichael, the issue was never discussed. In Ware, the court 
avoided the statute's bar against "injunctions" by granting only 
declaratory relief.281 
228 Abstention as to a factual hearing was held inappropriate on the 
"bad faith" attack in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 498 (1965). See 
also Baker v. Binder, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967); Brooks v. Briley, 
274 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967); Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 
(N.D. Ga. 1966). 
229 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 
(1903). Compare United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. 
denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962), with United States v. McLead, 385 F.2d 734 
(5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Edwards, 333 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1964); 
and United States v. Clark, 249 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ala. 1965). See 2 T. 
EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1105-1229 (Student ed. 1967). 
230 See generally, 2 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, supra note 229, 
for discussion of the problems of the legitimacy of state conduct with 
regard to education, the administration of justice, employment, housing, 
public accomodations, and welfare services. 
231 In Baker, the court followed the Ware procedure and granted only 
declaratory, and not injunctive, relief. The court in Baker did find § 1983 
to be an exception to § 2283, however. It seems probable that once it is 
decided that § 2283 does not bar declaratory relief, and such relief has 
been granted, an injunction can be issued without worrying about the § 
1983-§ 2283 problem because § 2283 specifically provided that an injunc-
tion may be issued against state court proceedings "to protect or effec-
tuate" a judgment. 
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The inarticulate premise on which these two camps differ on the 
abstention issue is whether state court procedures and remedies 
are likely to be effective in protecting first amendment rights. The 
eager courts accept the underlying premise of Dombrowski that 
to require resort to the state courts will probably render protec-
tion ineffective,232 and that federal procedures must be available 
to grant immediate protection if relief is warranted. There is 
little or no discussion of the abstention and comity arguments 
that occupy so much space in the decisions of the reluctant courts 
-arguments which, sotto voce, accept the premise that relief 
through the state court system is available and adequate.233 
This failure of both sides to discuss the underlying issue has 
weakened the decisions. In rushing to enforce Dombrowski's man-
date, the eager courts have ignored, avoided, or summarily dealt 
with the issues that should have been met directly. The reluctant 
courts overuse, and sometimes misuse, ripeness, comity, and absten-
tion arguments to avoid decision on questions which Dombrowski 
commands them to decide. It is incumbent upon the eager courts 
to meet these issues to strengthen Dombrowski and assert a new 
aggressive federalism. 
Finally, Boll and Brooks fail to adequately distinguish between 
the requirements for declaratory and injunctive relief. Boll indi-
cates that failure to establish need for injunctive relief also bars 
declaratory relief. And Brooks indicates that "it is clear that the 
prohibition under section 2283 against enjoining state court proceed-
ings cannot be avoided by seeking a declaratory judgment."234 
Koota seems to dispense with the notion that there is no difference 
between declaratory and injunctive relief in this area. 
Ware and Baker understood and acted upon this distinction even 
before Koota was decided. Although Baker indicated that the 
Civil Rights Act was an exception to the anti-injunction statute, it 
refrained from issuing an injunction on the assumption that "the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky and City officials will withhold any 
enforcement action against ... plaintiffs."235 Ware acts upon the 
same assumption in granting only declaratory relief, but" [does] 
232 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (dissenting opinion). 
233 The point is only broached in Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 
(N.D. Ga. 1966), when the court abstains from determining the validity of 
the Georgia riot statute on the grounds that (1) the indictments charged 
"hard core" conduct, and (2) the statute was susceptible of a permissible 
limiting construction in a single state criminal proceeding. Arguably, how-
ever, since the indictments were returned after the federal suit was filed, 
and only because the federal court refused to issue a temporary restrain-
ing order, the court should have considered the case as falling within the 
Dombrowski "loophole," 380 U.S. at 482 n.2, since the indictments were 
returned only because the federal court erroneously refused to restrain the 
state. See McSurely v. Ratliff, Civil No. 1146 (E.D. Ky., Sept. 14, 1967). 
234 274 F. Supp. at 553. 
235 274 F. Supp. at 664. 
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not reach the question of whether . . . 1983 [is an] exception to 
... 2283."236 Koota points up the distinction, therefore, in a suit 
filed before any state proceeding was initiated. Ware and Baker, 
operating on the same assumption about the conduct of state offi-
cials, but on differing legal interpretations of the relation between 
sections 1983 and 2283, make this distinction operative in suits filed 
after state criminal prosecutions have begun.237 
V. PRESUMPTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 
This article has, so far, been devoted primarily to an analysis of 
the legal issues which must be resolved in providing maximum 
protection for first amendment rights while accommodating the con-
flicts which may arise between state and federal courts. However, 
these issues are decided within a conceptual framework of what 
the problems are, how federalism works and should work in this 
area, and what solutions are needed. Differing perspectives on 
the social dangers posed by restricting the state in its administra-
tion of public order as opposed to restricting speech activities; 
various presumptions about the operation of the state and federal 
court systems; and an understanding of the need for immediate 
rather than delayed protection of first amendment rights, shape 
this framework. The aim of this conclusion is merely to pose some 
relevant considerations about these problems. 
Dombrowski did not change the view that first amendment 
rights are of paramount importance in our social and political 
scheme. Likewise, it did not really alter the understanding of the 
threats to speech activities posed by vague or overbroad criminal 
statutes.238 What it did was begin to recognize that the "scheme of 
things" has gone askew. The preferential treatment to be ac-
!l36 Ware v. Nichols, 266F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Miss. 1967). Both Ware and 
Baker support the comity doctrine on the assumption that state officials 
will heed the declaratory judgment. 
237 Since the preparation of this article, many additional suits have been 
filed requesting declaratory, injunctive, or other relief against threatened 
or pending criminal prosecutions affecting first amendment rights. These 
suits are all grounded in the theories made viable by Dombrowski. Cases 
which have reached decision include Burmeister v. New York City Police 
Dep't, 275 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Landry v. Daley, Civil No. 67-C-
1863 (N.D. Ill., E. Div., March 1, 1968) (two opinions: one judge declaring 
two Chicago ordinances unconstitutional; three judge court finding two 
Illinois statutes valid). Cases still pending in federal district courts include 
Soglin v. Kauffman, Civil No. 67-C-141 (W.D. Wis. 1967) (challenging 
WIS. STAT. § 947.01 [1965], the disorderly eonduct statute challenged in 
Zwicker v. Boll, 270 F. Supp. 131 [W.D. Wis. 1967]); Wynn v. Bryne, Civil 
No. 991-67 (D.N.J. 1967) (challenging the hundreds of prosecutions arising 
out of the 1967 Newark riots); Burks v. Schott, Civil No. 6478 (S.D. Ohio 
1967) (challenging prosecutions arising out of Cincinnati urban disorders); 
Warren v. Groves, Civil No. 3483 (S.D. Ohio 1968) (challenging the Ohio 
"riot" statute). 
238 Amsterdam, supra note 66. 
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corded first amendment freedoms in theory was not often enough 
found where it counts: on the street, at the police station, in city 
hall, or in the lowest state courts. 
The doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth serve (in the area 
of the first amendment) partly as a mediator between "all the 
organs of public coercion of a state and . . . the institution of fed-
eral protection of the individual's private interests."239 Vague-
ness, basically a due process concept, rests primarily on the ra-
tionale that a person is entitled to a "fair warning" as to what 
conduct is criminally proscribed. The rationale goes beyond this 
to require that statutes also be specific so that a trial court may 
properly judge guilt or innocence, and an appellate court may have 
some meaningful frame of reference within which to review what 
the trial court has done. Overbreadth is concerned with a crimi-
nal statute's language infringing first amendment activities, either 
explicitly or by being susceptible to possible application to protected 
conduct. The value decision which places speech activities in a 
preferred position, bolstered by the supremacy clause, dictates to 
the state that "when it approaches the foothills of First Amend-
ment freedoms, it must step with far greater care"240 in proscribing 
conduct than in other areas. 
Both doctrines, however, are concerned with more than the pre-
cision of legislative drafting. They express substantive concerns. 
Speaking to this, Professor Amsterdam has stated: 
The doctrine determines, in effect, to what extent the ad-
ministration of public order can assume a form which, first, 
makes possible the deprivation sub silentio of the rights of 
particular citizens and second, makes virtually ineffica-
cious the federal judicial machinery established for the 
vindication of those rights.241 
Dombrowski, however, was not directed to any reevaluation of 
the preference for free speech or the dangers of vague and over-
broad statutes, but to the ways in which these preferences can be 
asserted and these dangers met. 242 
The real remaining conflict is which court system should initially 
be allowed to consider these issues. Until Dombrowski, except 
in extraordinary situations, it was assumed that the state court 
239 [d. at 81. 
240 Zwicker v. Boll, 270 F. Supp. 131, 147 (W.D. Wis. 1967). 
241 Amsterdam, supra note 66, at 81. 
242 It is no hyperbole to say that the critical issues of human liberty in 
this country today are not issues of rights, but of remedies. . . . The 
American citizen has a right of free expression, but he may be 
arrested, jailed, fined under guise of bail and put to every risk and 
rancor of the criminal process if he expresses himself unpopularly. 
The "right" is there on paper; what is needed is the machinery to 
make the paper right a practical protection. Brief for NAACP Legal 
Defense and Education Fund as Amicus Curiae, at 17-18, Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 377 U.S. 976 (1964). 
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system should consider the matter in the first instance, since it 
was in a better position to construe its state's criminal statutes, 
and since it was the state that would lose a weapon against civil 
disorder should a statute fall. Because a properly functioning 
state process is essential to a working federalism in the criminal 
area, state courts should be reinforced in their roles as the primary 
tribunals to consider these matters. But it is suggested, perhaps 
rather obviously, that the state court's role, whether fulfilled or 
not in reality, includes making sure that the state does not func-
tion in the criminal field so as to destroy or thwart federal rights. 
There is a difference between what can generally be expected of a 
state court when it is resolving conflicting state and federal in-
interests in a particular case, and when it is the very existence 
of the state court proceeding that is challenged as the threat to the 
federal right.243 
Specifically, the maintenance of maximum freedom in the area of 
speech is of paramount national interest. It should be of para-
mount state interest. The question therefore arises, as in Dom-
browski, whether the very existence of a state criminal proceeding, 
or a state criminal statute, will be destructive of this paramount 
interest. It has been held time and again, for example, that various 
prior restraints on speech activities are invalid, regardless of the 
fact that, in a particular battle, "speech" may triumph over the 
restraint (for example, a police chief with unlimited discretion to 
issue parade permits does grant such a permit to organization X) .244 
Dombrowski has determined that threats under vague or over-
broad statutes, and the existence of certain criminal prosecutions, 
are likewise invalid because by their very nature they restrain or 
chill legitimate speech activities. The assumption that the chilling 
effect will occur is made regardless of the prospects for success or 
failure in the particular case. The key reason in both instances is 
that the normal procedures-defense of a state criminal prosecu-
tion and the appellate route-have the immediate and permanently 
destructive effect of restraint on the exercise of speech. The only 
corrective relief is so distant and ephemeral that the delayed vin-
dication of the first amendment rights is no real relief at all. The 
delay alone is a denial of effective protection of speech activities. 
Add the Dombrowski presumption that criminal prosecutions norm-
ally do not allow for correction of the evils and the "unarticu-
lated assumption that state courts will not be as prone as federal 
243 Professor Amsterdam notes, as must I, that "I am not making the 
naive assumption that all federal district judges are appropriately sym-
pathetic to the enforcement of all or any federal rights. . .. Institutions 
must be designed in view of generalities; as a generality, I have no doubt 
that the federal judges are more enlightened concerning, more tolerant 
toward, and more courageous to protect, federal rights than are their state 
counterparts." Amsterdam, supra note 66, at 837 n.186. 
244 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Emerson, The Doctrine 
of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955). 
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courts to vindicate constitutional rights promptly and effective-
IY,"245 and it becomes apparent that there is a glaring need for 
uniform and speedy relief.246 
It is submitted that the only way at present to achieve this uni-
form, speedy relief throughout the nation is to require federal 
district courts to decide challenges made to the legitimacy of state 
proceedings or statutes. Although a working relationship between 
the state and federal courts is obviously desirable, it is not neces-
sarily the pinnacle value. 
Stated as an unqualified preference for state administra-
tion of federal law which takes its shape within a matrix of 
state law regulation, the argument evidently proves too 
much; for every congressionally created federal trial juris-
diction constitutes to some extent a subordination of that 
value to the values of federal law enforcement by nation-
ally responsible tribunals. And if it is true that constitu-
tional restrictions on the state criminal process present a 
particularly fertile field for valuable interaction of federal 
and state law in the state courts, it is also true that they 
present a particularly strong adversity of state and fed-
eral interests, and hence a particularly strong risk that 
federal rights will suffer if left in state hands.247 
Another point which must be considered is that the issue is not 
whether federal courts should have any jurisdiction to review the 
legitimacy of state criminal proceedings, but whether the stage at 
which the review occurs should be altered. "Not all intrusions 
are equally abrasive."248 Normally, federal courts intrude only 
after procedures within the state have been exhausted. "Speech" 
therefore fights the same battle over and over again, and the 
state is given a renewed opportunity in every case to correct a 
given evil. Yet value decisions have been made in related areas of 
federal jurisdiction-removal in civil rights cases, diversity and 
federal question jurisdiction, and anticipatory habeas corpus249-
that the state process inherently has sufficient prejudice within it 
to warrant a presumption that federal relief must be available at 
an early stage in the process. Section 1983 created, and Dom-
browski has finally recoguized, the presumption that the state proc-
ess is inherently ill-equipped to handle the kinds of challenges to 
state authority made in a way which will afford any meaningful 
protection to speech activities. Arguably, intrusion by the lowest 
federal court-more aware of local interests and pressures, and 
closest to the problems-creates less conflict than intrusion by the 
Supreme Court on appeal. I do not speak of "conflict" in the sense 
245 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (dissenting opinion). 
See also Brewer, supra note 2, at 95; Boyer, supra note 2, at 85. 
246 See Brewer, supra note 2, at 71, 94, 95; Boyer, supra note 2, at 51. 
247 Amsterdam, supra note 66, at 836. 
248 Id. at 835. 
249 28 U.S.C. §§ 1443, 1331-32, 2241 (1964). 
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that some of the local citizenry get any less excited about "federal 
interference."250 I speak of "conflict" in terms of preserving as 
much of the state process as possible. The intrusion comes at an 
early stage in the process, rather than at the very end, and the 
state saves a considerable investment in time, money, and pres-
tige if it learns of its errors early. Intervention at this stage would 
allow the state a meaningful opportunity to correct the evil; for 
example, by obtaining a permissible limiting construction of the 
vague statute in a state declaratory judgment proceeding; by find-
ing another, constitutionally specific statute under which to 
charge; by deciding not to pursue prosecution any further; by disci-
plining officials found to be acting in "bad faith;" and ultimately, 
it is hoped, by providing affirmative protection to speech activities. 
If the state then proceeded further, it would do so with the con-
tours of its powers clearly defined and the importance of the fed-
eral interests firmly and freshly impressed upon it by the fed-
eral court.251 
Another reason for early consideration by a federal court lies in 
the need for a fact-finding process as free as possible from bias, 
prejudice, and confusion. With regard to a bad faith attack, for 
example, the very evil under attack often is that the prosecution 
was in some way motivated by strong local bias, prejudice, or 
bigotry. In this circumstance, a legitimate presumption is cre-
ated that the fact-finding process will have a better chance of 
being correct and complete in the federal forum. The classic dif-
ferences which make the federal courts, on the whole, less likely to 
be responsive to local prejudices-lifetime tenure of judges and se-
cure salaries-show their importance particularly in cases where 
the court is called upon to protect those who have incurred the 
wrath of local powers. Clean fact-finding is also crucial to a mean-
250 It is probably true that a federal district judge who, by various orders 
restricting state activities, supports the speech activities of unpopular mi-
norities or dissenters, will be subject to substantially more abuse than would 
the Supreme Court if it issued the same order. This is due to many factors, 
including the fact that the judge is a part of the local community. The 
sense of "betrayal" felt by the community when he lends his support to 
an unpopular cause will be greater than when similar support is furnished 
by a distant, and quite impersonal Supreme Court. Also significant is the 
fact that the decision is likely to be rendered while local passions over the 
incidents or individuals involved are still aroused. For example, Judge 
James E. Doyle, the sole federal judge for the Western District of Wiscon-
sin was criticized when he issued a series of temporary restraining orders 
against various punitive actions by the State of Wisconsin initiated against 
the antiwar demonstrators who were the plaintiffs in Zwicker v. Boll, 270 
F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Wis. 1967). 
251 Dombrowski "will definitely have the effect of causing state prose-
cutors and trial courts to test the facts of cases raising basic constitutional 
questions against controlling Supreme Court decisions, for the accuracy of 
their efforts in this connection may be put to the test in the federal courts." 
Brewer, supra note 2, at 105. 
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ingful appellate review, since so many legal determinations turn 
on the scope and nature of the fact-finding process. 
Professor Amsterdam suggests that expansion of the civil rights 
removal statute provides the best way to "clearly, cleanly and 
completely"252 exclude these cases from the state court jurisdic-
tion. He presents strong arguments which demonstrate that the 
amount of friction created is far less when a matter is removed 
completely than when touchy and sensitive factual issues must be 
tried 'concerning the competency of the state court.253 
However, removal is not necessarily the best remedy when the 
criminal proceeding itself is challenged. The "removal of friction" 
between the systems, although important, should not be the para-
mount concern. It is more important to achieve the maximum pro-
tection possible for first amendment activities, even at the expense 
of retaining a certain amount of friction. A criminal proceeding, 
even in the federal courts, imposes burdens on the individual 
and on speech activities, which warrant the existence of a pro-
cedure which relieves these burdens until it is determined that a 
criminal proceeding is, indeed, legitimate. Removal will eliminate 
certain problems of prejudice inherent in the state courts, and may 
cleanse the fact-finding process, but it will not eliminate the serious 
prejudice present in the criminal proceeding itself. Likewise, it 
will not obviate the threat of prosecution for others. It initially 
accepts the very determination-that a criminal proceeding may 
constitutionally be begun-which is challenged as invalid. To 
resolve the matter in a federal court, therefore, would relieve only 
part of the chilling effect. 
The ultimate consideration is that the availability of federal power 
against state infringement of federally protected rights of free 
speech and assembly must be as immediate and effective as is state 
power to seize membership lists, destroy a demonstration, or ar-
rest a speaker. The state courts, in theory, should exercise their 
power to protect these federal interests. "[B] ut the battle is not 
over theory. The battle is for the streets, and on the.streets convic-
tion [or even arrest] now is worth a hundred times reversal 
later."254 The Dombrowski remedy is essential to the realization of 
immediate affirmative protection for speech activities. Hopefully, 
the use of federal power now will help create state systems willing 
to lend as much immediate power to protecting these activities as 
they presently do to thwart them. 
VI. CLOSING NOTE 
Subsequent to the preparation of this article, the United States 
252 Amsterdam, supra note 66, at 835. 
253 rd. 
2fi4 rd. at 801. 
412 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW [VOL. 1968:369 
Supreme Court decided Cameron v. Johnson.255 Justice Brennan, 
for the majority, held that the Mississippi Unlawful Picketing 
statute was not void for vagueness or overbreadth, and that the 
evidentiary hearing had not established a bad faith prosecution. 
The decision confirms that neither abstention nor section 2283 
prevent a consideration of the merits of the two Dombrowski chal-
lenges. As to the vagueness and overbreadth attack, declaratory 
relief must issue if the statute's invalidity is established. As to 
the bad faith attack, the Court denied equitable relief after con-
sidering the issue on its merits. It did not reach the issue of 
whether section 2283 would bar the issuance of an injunction other-
wise thought appropriate. Both the majority and Justices Fortas 
and Douglas, in dissent, expressly reserve decision on this point.256 
The burden which the Court intimates must be met to justify 
equitable relief against prosecutorial abuse is an extremely un-
realistic and onerous one.257 This test appears to allow state of-
ficials to harass the exercise of protected expression so long as 
they have an expectation of obtaining conviction. Since the same 
community attitudes which promote or condone the police action 
are likely to support the locally elected prosecutor and judge, or 
locally selected jury, the expectation of conviction should not be 
the crucial factor. It was hoped, rather, that the Supreme Court 
would accept the more realistic philosophy of the fifth circuit, 
which considers "guilt" as only one of many relevant factors.258 
Cameron seems to allow a readily accessible remedy, in the form 
of a suit for declaratory judgment, to attack the use of vague or 
overbroad statutes. When the harrassment of protected expression 
is pursued under a facially valid statute, however, Cameron's lan-
guage seems to impose an almost overwhelming evidentiary bur-
den. Whether the test announced in Cameron is as stringent as it 
appears must await further litigation. 
255 36 U.S.L.W. 4319 (April 22, 1968). 
256 Id. at 4320 n.3; Id. at 4324 n.5. 
257 Id. at 4322. 
258 See, e.g., United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 744 (1967): "Police 
may arrest guilty people for reasons other than their guilt-for example 
for the reason that they are Negroes who want to register and vote." 
